### 1

#### The aff invests in a failed modernity that atomizes oneself from the world. Their political project is not neutral nor unique but is part and parcel of a larger lineage of hyperindividualism that maintains the broader conditions of violent crisis. Divesting commitments from one another is not an option and perpetuates an

It is unselfconscious privilege that allows us to fantasize—counterfactually—that we each survive alone.**[[1]](#footnote-1)**

#### When in fact

In order to survive, we need help, and help is always the service of another, with or without intent.[[2]](#footnote-2)

#### We are on the cusp of civilizational collapse – the only question of this debate is will we go down with it or will we escape and carve out a new future.

Lövbrand et al 6-11 (Eva Lövbrand, Senior Lecturer in the Department of Thematic Studies at Linkoping University, Malin Möbjork, Senior Researcher and Director of the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute’s Climate Change and Risk Programme, Rickard Söder, Research Assistant at the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, “The Antropocene and the geo-political imagination: Re-writing Earth as political space,” June 11, 2020, Earth System Governance)

The endangered world is a discourse that draws energy from Earth system science and its proposition that humanity at the end of the 20th Century has become an Earth shaping agent that now rivals some of the great forces of nature (Brondizio et al., 2016; Steffen et al., 2011). The Anthropocene here marks a shift from the stable Holocene era within which human civilizations have developed and thrived. As outlined by Steffen et al. (2011), the ‘great acceleration’ in human population, economic exchange, technological development, material consumption and international mobility following the end of World War II has left an unprecedented imprint on the global environment and fundamentally altered humanity's relationship to Earth. By degrading the planet's ecological systems and eroding its capacity to absorb our wastes, humanity has dangerously disrupted the Earth system and pushed the planet into a more hostile state from which we cannot easily return (Pereira and Freitas, 2017; Steffen et al., 2011). The endangered world presents a global scene where new environmental threats and dangers are causing socio-economic turbulence and gradually altering the geopolitical map. In the Arctic, for instance, Young (2012) finds that the interacting forces of climate change and globalization are transforming environments at unprecedented rates and opening up the region to outside forces. Non-linear shifts in sea ice and thawing permafrost have unleashed mounting interest in the region's natural resources and invited Great Powers to enhance their commercial shipping, fossil fuel extraction and industrial fishing (Young, 2012). Similarly, Willcox (2016) outlines how climate change is posing a grave external threat to the self-determination of atoll island peoples in the Pacific region. As sea level rises and storms increase in frequency, states such as Tuvalu, Kiribati, and the Maldives are facing loss of habitable territory and relocation of entire populations (Willcox, 2016). In other parts of the world climate change is triggering vectorborne diseases, freshwater shortage, crop failure and food scarcity (Floyd, 2015). While these threats are most pressing in already fragile regions, they are multi-scalar, interconnected, and transboundary in nature and may therefore cause human insecurity and political instability in areas distant from their origin (Hommel and Murphy, 2013; DeFries et al., 2012; Pereira, 2015). The endangered world is a discourse that challenges the modern spatialization of the world into a system of states with unquestionable political boundaries and mutually hostile armed camps (Agnew, 1998). As outlined by Pereira and Freitas (2017), many of the human-produced dangers of climate change have no parallel in history and work in complex, uncertain and unpredictable ways. The dangers are often diffuse, indirect and transnational and hereby make the world more interconnected and interdependent than ever imagined by IR. While this discourse recognizes that climate change may endanger the territories and populations of particular states, it is the global biosphere that is the primary referent object of security. The entire life-support system of the planet is under threat and the role of global politics is to regain control for the sake of human wellbeing and security (Floyd, 2015). As noted by Steffen at al. (2011, p. 749) the planetary nature of the challenge is unique and demands a global-scale response that transcends national boundaries and cultural divides. In order to avoid that large parts of the human population and modern society as a whole will collapse, humanity has to rise to the challenge and become a responsible steward of our own life-support system (Steffen et al., 2011). Geographical imbalances in human suffering and vulnerability form part of this new story for global politics (Biermann et al., 2016; Da Costa Ferreira and Barbi, 2016; O'Brien, 2011). However, in the endangered world it is the aggregated human effect on the Earth system that is the primary object of concern. The endangered world draws energy from a long line of liberal institutionalist thinking to foster responsible Earth system stewardship. In order to gain control over the unfolding sustainability crisis and effectively govern the Anthropocene, this discourse insists that the world needs strong global institutions that can balance competing national interests and facilitate coordinated policy responses (Da Costa Ferreira and Barbi, 2016; Young, 2012). Hence, the liberal democratic order organized around the United Nations and its various treaty-regimes remains central to the vision of global politics advanced here. However, given the complex and dispersed nature of 21st century challenges, international policy responses need to rest upon multi-level governance approaches that respond to the varied role of people and places in causation and effect of global environmental changes (Biermann et al., 2016; Steffen et al., 2011). In order to build links across local, national and global scales, effective governance in the Anthropocene also hinges on integrated scientific assessments of critical Earth system processes and scenario planning that anticipates the systemic risks and security implications of ecosystem change (Hommel and Murphy, 2013; Steffen et al., 2011). As outlined by Dumaine and Mintzer (2015). In the Anthropocene traditional security thinking makes little analytical sense in a world bound together by complex, non-linear and closely coupled environmental risks security analysts must move beyond the assumption that the main purpose of defense is to secure the nation against external, state-based, mainly military threats. In order to respond to the dangers of a radically transformed global environment, states need to cultivate a shared view about common threats and improve collective capacities for early warning, rapid response, and disaster mitigation (Dumaine and Mintzer, 2015). 2.2. The entangled world: securing peaceful co-existence In parallel to the science-driven and liberal institutionalist imagination informing the endangered world, the Anthropocene has also given energy to a post-humanist IR discourse that confronts the grand narratives of modernity and the forms of global politics they give rise to. Similar to the endangered world, this E. Lovbrand et al. / Earth System Governance 4 (2020) 100051 € 3 parallel discourse describes the Anthropocene as a complex and unpredictable era when human and natural processes have become deeply intertwined. However, the Anthropocene is here not approached as a problem that can be reversed, resolved or governed (Johnson and Morehouse, 2014). As outlined by Harrington (2016, p. 481) it instead reflects a new reality where humans, nonhumans, things, and materials co-exist in complex relations of life and non-life. In this entangled universe, the Cartesian separation between nature and culture has broken down and the world as conceived by modernity has ended. Dualistic understandings of the active, progressive and morally countable human (subject) and the passive and static externality of nature (object) are replaced by much more contingent, fragile and unpredictable networks of relations (Fagan, 2017). In a world marked by melting ice caps, thawing permafrost, acidified oceans, accelerating deforestation, degraded agricultural lands and dramatic species loss, human activity and nature are so enmeshed that they are existentially indistinguishable. A complex but singular “social nature” is now the new planetary real, claim Burke et al. (2016, p. 510). The entangled world is a discourse that draws upon the Anthropocene to destabilize and radically rethink the conceptual frameworks that underpin contemporary global politics. It confronts a state-centric world obsessed with bargaining, power and interests with the monumental risks, threats, and physical effects of a transformed global environment (Burke et al., 2016; Harrington, 2016). In a time when industrialized and profit-driven human societies are dangerously enmeshed with the biosphere, national security based on keeping ‘the Other’ out is failing the reality of the planet and portraying the wrong world picture. The magnitude and reach of contemporary environmental risks mean that “the Other is always already inside, so bound up with us in a common process that it no longer makes sense to speak of inside and outside” (Burke et al., 2016, p. 502). The dawning of the age of the human hereby challenges modern understandings of security at the most fundamental level. In the entangled world, the idea that we can secure humanity against external threats is precisely the problem that needs to be overcome (Chandler, 2018, p. 10). In the words of Hamilton (2017b, p. 586, italics in original), “(i)f humans are nature, and the Anthropocene demands the securing of humanity (and all life) from the unpredictable planetary conditions “we” are “making”, then the aim of security ultimately becomes that of securing oneself from oneself “. The entangled world is as much a philosophical event as an environmental one that challenges modern conceptions of who we are as humans and how we relate to the world around us. Humans are conceived simultaneously as central and all-powerful, and fragmented and insignificant (Fagan, 2017). By reaching into deep geological time, the human-induced ecological crisis offers a new cosmological origin and ending story that alters today's basic presuppositions of what the Earth and the ‘human condition’ are (Hamilton, 2018, p. 391). “Even in the study of deep time and geological shifts, we cannot escape ourselves” (Harrington, 2016, p. 479). Faced with humanity's overwhelming Earth-shaping powers we appear adrift, claim Johnson and Morehouse (2014, p. 442), “alienated not only from a world that refuses to submit to long-held conceptual frameworks, but also alienated from ourselves in relation to this strange and allegedly destructive thing called ‘humanity’“. The entangled world hereby forces IR into an uncomfortable place where many of the discipline's organizing categories break down: the logics of inclusion and exclusion; the idea of agency and a unified human subject; and the imagination of an intelligible world as a whole (Fagan, 2017, p. 294). In face of the ontological shift brought about by the Anthropocene, IR is called upon to rethink the narrow anthropocentric, state-led, economistic boundaries that solidify the bygone age of the Holocene (Harrington, 2016, p. 480). The entangled world presents a global scene of complex interconnections and interdependencies that cut across conventional geographical and temporal scales and species boundaries. Security cannot be achieved by resolute actions grounded in expression of power targeting ‘external’ threats, but only by re-embedding modern humanity in the multi-species world that we now are remaking. As argued by Burke et al. (2016, p. 502) we cannot survive without accepting the cosmopolitan and enmeshed nature of this world. In a world of entangled relations security comes from being more connected, not less (ibid). Against this backdrop McClanahan and Brisman (2015) find proposals from the US security establishment to wage war on climate change deeply problematic. Militaristic assertions that we can win the fight against climate change reproduce the modern understanding of nature as exterior that we so desperately need to transcend. What the world needs is instead a new global political project that makes peace with Earth and hereby secures mutual co-existence (Burke et al., 2016; McClanahan and Brisman, 2015). Such a project is by necessity post-human, claim Cudworth and Hobden (2013). In order to move beyond human centrism and domination we must recognize that social and political life always is bound up with non-human beings and things. In the Anthropocene the environment is not ‘out there’, but always ‘with’ and ‘in here’ (Cudworth and Hobden, 2013, p. 654). To end human-caused extinctions, prevent dangerous climate change, save the oceans, support vulnerable multi-species populations, and restore social justice, the entangled world therefore demands a ‘worldly politics’ that brings our multi-species interrelations to the foreground of global affairs (Burke et al., 2016).

#### The quantitative and qualitative data in the field of IR is not produced neutrally but through articulating specific, pre-determined goals regarding the international order and finding evidence to justify those theorizations. Presumed objectivity naturalizes colonial management and brackets out the possibility of social life for those targeted for abuse

Agathangelou and Ling 04 (Anna M. Agathangelou and L. H. M. Ling, University of Houston-Clear Lake and Global Change Institute and New School University, “The House of IR: From Family Power Politics to the Poisies of Worldism,” 2004, International Studies Review)

Cosmo Man distracts attention from the academy’s collusion with power. He publicly welcomes ‘‘multicultural,’’ ‘‘international’’ education while privately deters tenure and promotion for faculty, especially those of color and women, who challenge capitalist-patriarchy’s version of Self and Other. Cosmo Man, thus, reenacts in the academy those desires and abuses that shadow the colonial household. As Steve Smith (2004) has noted, mainstream IR conveniently relieves us of any ethical qualms regarding the larger world. We are not responsible, mainstream theorists shrug, because our concepts are ‘‘value-free,’’ ‘‘rational,’’ and ‘‘objective.’’ We teach/advise/publish what anyone would in our place. Smith resoundingly rejects this stance as disingenuous at best. We forward a second critique: claims of neutrality smoke-screen alignments with power structurally, institutionally, and personally. The House and its accomplices hide their class politics by castigating revolutionary knowledge as ‘‘occult’’ (Kelsh 1998). One consequence is the (re)production of insecurity for the world’s majority through the securing of capital and its social relations across borders for a privileged minority. Take, for examples, the absence of any role for non-Western cultures, histories, or ideologies in Gramscian IPE’s conception of a ‘‘global’’ hegemony (cf. Ling 1996; Ling with Bell 1996), Marxist IPE’s decision not to acknowledge reproduction as production (cf. Agathangelou 2004b), and postmodernism’s disservice to local resistance by assuming that power contaminates everything and everywhere (cf. Agathangelou and Ling 1997). Each demonstrates, respectively, an implicit valorization of one configuration of race/culture (white/Western), gender (patriarchal), sexuality (heterosexual), and class (bourgeois). When this configuration encounters crisis or threat, the discipline generates rationalizations to assure global capital of its right to privatize and militarize social life. Put differently, the house gives white, bourgeois patriarchy the tools to rebuild itself. Yet institutions of higher learning increasingly clamor for multicultural, international education. Note, for instance, Harvard University’s recent curriculum change, the first in thirty years, to reflect this orientation. ‘‘If you’re going to come to Harvard College,’’ announced William C. Kirby, Dean of Faculty Arts and Sciences, ‘‘it would be very good to have a passport.’’19 Externally, the academy needs to satisfy globalization’s demand for a more cosmopolitan, educated elite. Internally, the academy also needs to globalize to: (1) retain an increasingly multiethnic student body, especially those who can pay high tuition fees during times of constricting budget cuts (see McPherson and Schapiro 1999), (2) uphold its liberal reputation as a ‘‘marketplace of ideas,’’ and (3) keep apace with managerial, financial, and technical trends arising in various parts of the world. These apparent contradictions allow the academy and its elites to use the intellectual labor of Others while denying them due credit or acknowledgement for it (Agathangelou and Ling 2002). This appropriation is not for cultural stakes only. It provides an intellectual justification for an unequal access to and distribution of wealth (Agathangelou 2004a). Not surprisingly, white males dominate our discipline. Males comprise 66 percent of the total faculty in the United States, with whites in the overwhelming majority (American Association of University Professors 1998). Male full professors outnumber female full professors by nearly 5 to 1 whereas at the rank of assistant professor the proportion of males to females is relatively equal (American Association of University Professors 1998). Put differently, nearly half (46 percent) of all assistant professors are women, but they become only 21 percent of all full professors (Bellas 2002). Data on postgraduate enrollment in US academies bear out this initial scenario. A relatively even spread of men and women not only enter the classroom but also graduate with higher degrees. In the social sciences, women accounted for 57 percent of all graduate enrollment in 1997 (Brandes et al. 2001:325). As a general category, women received 49 percent of doctorates in the social sciences in 1993, with a steady increase for women of color.20 The National Center for Education Statistics (NCES) (1997) expects this trend to continue until the end of the century. Yet all male faculty enjoy an average 10 percent advantage in salary at both public and private institutions (Bellas 2002) whereas nearly half of all faculty appointments made at institutions of higher learning fall in the adjunct or other part-time categoryFwith women as the majority recipients (American Association of University Professors 1993).21 These data do not break down according to racial categories. Nonetheless, anecdotal evidence suggests that the racial and gender disproportion found in the academy’s ‘‘formal sector’’ would spill over to its ‘‘informal’’ one. Cosmo Man triumphs in the academy.22 Like his counterpart in the global economy, Cosmo Man takes on ‘‘science, technology, [and] business’’ with an ‘‘entrepreneurial frontier masculinity,’’ ready to conquer new markets, new products, and new consumers (Hooper 2000:67). Indeed, Cosmo Man exemplifies white, heteropatriarchal renditions of globalization. One renowned white-male theorist writes that globalization means the freedom, choice, and authority to straddle the world with ‘‘competence’’ and ‘‘mastery,’’ not ‘‘surrender[ing]’’ to or ‘‘negotiat[ing]’’ with other cultures but imbued with a sense of ‘‘personal autonomy’’ that allows ‘‘exit’’ at will (Hannerz 1990:239). The academy rewards such intellectual compliance. The Grawemeyer Award for Ideas Improving World Order, for instance, consistently confers its cash prize of $200,000 to those who happen to be white, male, from Western institutions, and offer intellectual paeans to the House of IR.23 Administrative decisions support Cosmo Man. Tenure and promotion disputes, in particular, expose his colonial and imperialistic practices in the academy. One Asian American female professor has observed that [i]f we act like the [passive] Singapore Girl, in the case of some professors, then they feel ‘‘she is [unequal to me].’’ If we don’t act like the Singapore Girl, then [our] accomplishments must have derived from ‘‘a relationship with the chair’’ [or some other senior male]. (quoted in Cho 1997:209) In either case, she concludes, an Asian American womanFor any woman of colorFhas difficulty obtaining recognition for her professional achievements. This is so, we add, because she must function in a context, like the House of IR, that is defined by the white colonial/imperial state intimately aligned with global capitalism. As Stoler (2002:45) notes, ‘‘sexual control was more than a convenient metaphor for colonial domination. It was a fundamental class and racial marker implicated in a wider set of relations of power.’’ Similarly, the academy preserves its privileges with racialized, sexualized colonial management. Knowledge Production: Deracination and Depoliticization With such institutional backing, the House of IR deracinates and depoliticizes knowledge even by those, like postmodern feminists, who claim the opposite. Such intellectual politics inflicts an epistemic violence that psychologizes systemic pathologies while mystifying the exploitation and violence they commit on Others through knowledge production. Some Others, in turn, consent to internalize their own structural oppression in exchange for admission into the House not as a ‘‘servant’’ or ‘‘ward’’ but ‘‘honored guest.’’ Even so, another desire complex arises in the House of IR. It publicly seeks to do good (‘‘spreading democracy’’) while privately yearning for adoration and respect from the Other that the Self will never find satiable (‘‘why do they hate us?’’). In a volume self-consciously titled, Global Voices: Dialogues in International Relations (Rosenau 1993), four IR scholars (two men, two women, all white, all Western) critically discuss the field. Each scholar deserves due credit, for his or her insights have contributed to our understanding and evaluation of the House of IR. Nonetheless, one chapter by a postmodern feminist disturbs (Sylvester 1993). She seeks validly to introduce race and difference into the dialogue on IR but masks her privilege with colonizing and monopolizing strategies. She writes in the name of a Zimbabwean woman rather than having an actual conversation with one. The chapter is written creatively in the form of a play with exchanges from various characters, two of whom are Westfem and Tsitsi. Westfem represents a Western feminist standpoint; Tsitsi, the Zimbabwean woman. Throughout the play, Tsitsi speaks only in terms of her own particularities whereas Westfem pronounces on theory, history, and politics in a universal tone. At one point, Westfem even lectures Tsitsi about Zimbabwean men to which the latter submissively agrees. The colonizing move in this dialogue is all-too obvious and familiar: Westfem speaks for all; Tsitsi only for herself, and not very well. In fact, Tsitsi admits as much: Westfem-self, I tell you, we women have been gagged by tradition and colonialism for so long that now it is difficult for us to insist on our own voices, ideologies, and statecrafts. (Sylvester 1993:30) Such epistemic, political, and personal violence pervades the House of IR. The US academic self-righteously presents the woman of color as a victim of ‘‘ThirdWorld’’ patriarchy in need of ‘‘First-World’’ feminist rescue without questioning either her right or place to do so. No wonder many women of color, inside and outside the West, react to ‘‘feminism’’ as another code word for ‘‘imperialism.’’ The House of IR benefits from such infighting. As noted earlier, those who live ‘‘upstairs’’ by theorizing about ‘‘high politics’’ take little account of those who labor ‘‘downstairs’’ with their data collecting for ‘‘low politics’’ until some crisis in world politics requires specific, local knowledge. At that point, ethnographic ‘‘servants’’ must produce the information necessary for house members to plug into their theorizing. They treat this information as data only, not subject to theorizing or capable of retheorizing existing frameworks. Note, for example, recent revelations of torture and sexual abuse by American soldiers against Iraqi detainees at Abu Ghraib prison. Mainstream attention has localized the relations between US soldiers and Iraqi prisoners. Media pundits, military leaders, and psychological experts explain away the abuse as a psychological distortion rather than an expression of a larger socioeconomic and political pathology: that is, abuse of US power to secure hegemony for global capitalist-patriarchy. No one asks, for example, why certain identities (‘‘minority,’’ ‘‘them,’’ ‘‘queer’’) are always the target of abuse, while others (‘‘majority,’’ ‘‘us,’’ ‘‘straight’’) perpetrate it? As Sherene Razack (2000, 2004) demonstrates in her analysis of similar abuses by and among Canadian peacekeepers in Somalia, our colonial legacy of race, gender, class, and culture spares no one not even those fighting for ‘‘peace,’’ ‘‘democracy,’’ and ‘‘justice.’’

#### US Antitrust isn’t a domestic attitude, it’s an international structure that coerces and condemns other nations into a continual state structural adjustment. Competition bleeds outward and mutates developing nations into a deformed image of Empire that will never be cared for.

Waked 16 (Dina I. Waked, Assistant Professor of Law at Sciences Po Law School, “Adoption of Antitrust Laws in Developing Countries: Reasons and Challenges,” 2016, Journal of Law Economics and Policy, Vol. 12.2)

The unprecedented spread of antitrust laws in the 1990s raises the question of why did developing countries adopt competition laws in the 1990s and not before? Further, why did so many of them suddenly become interested in competition law adoption? There is no simple answer, except to say that competition laws were not considered an important addition to their arsenal of laws up until the 1990s. One reason was that many countries had provisions either in their penal codes, civil codes, or commercial legislations dealing with competition law issues before formally adopting legislation that is solely concerned with competition matters.8 This made them less interested in adopting particular laws dealing with competition, seeing that they had general provisions in other legislation dealing with the same issues. Then why did so many suddenly become interested in these kind of laws in the 1990s? It is simplistic to argue, yet probably true, that many countries were entering trade agreements in the 1990s that made the adoption of competition law a prerequisite to the implementation of the trade deals.9 These treaties were either trade agreements creating free trade zones or part of structural programs that intended to open up the developing world economies and facilitated the entry of foreign entities that considered a competition law a necessity and guarantee for their work abroad, in particularly in a developing country. More generally, the 1990s are considered the era where developing world countries started to put an end to their former protectionist policies that were either inspired by communist or socialist regimes or simply by efforts to industrialize and strengthen national champions and local producers. The 1990s introduced the new era of international trade, encouraging foreign direct investment, and membership in regional trade agreements or the World Trade Organization (WTO). With the emergence of many of these structural changes, open door policies and participation in world trade relations, competition laws were suddenly prescribed as necessities to fa-cilitate much of the impending changes.10 It is important to understand the role played by the WTO and other international organizations in encouraging and often requiring new members to adopt these laws in order to understand the surge in the developing world.11 Similarly, the role played by the EU in encouraging new members and trade partners to adopt competition law is even more straightforward.12 Adopting these laws seemed to many as the missing link to assure growth and development.13 Therefore, one could argue that one of the main factors that led to the widespread adoption of competition laws across developing countries is the push exercised by supranational bodies. Another factor is the overwhelming evidence these international bodies were presenting to developing countries illustrating a positive relationship between adopting a competition law and development. Competition laws appeared to be the missing link needed to usher in prosperity and growth. The pressure by international bodies and the development hopes that adopting competition laws carried are discussed in more detail next. A. The Push by International Bodies to Adopt Competition Laws International and supranational bodies have considered competition laws essential for economic reforms. Ever since competition laws were discussed as part of the agenda of the negotiations to establish an International Trade Organization (ITO) after World War II, competition laws were considered a vital requirement for needed reforms. The General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) upheld the rhetoric of the ITO and included competition issues and restrictive business practices in a “best endeavor” clause.14 However, the GATT did not require the adoption of specific provisions dealing with the treatment of private restrictive business practices (RBPs).15 Therefore, the members of the WTO could freely adopt their own national competition laws so long as they did not infringe the principle of nondiscrimination.16 The General Council of the WTO created a Working Group in April 1997 on the Interaction Between Trade and Competition Policy. This Working Group strongly called on developing countries to adopt competition rules in the face of the global merger wave underway and the structural changes taking place within the developing countries as a result of their liberalization and free trade policies.17 The WTO's focus on competition law adoption is due to the widely believed interaction between competition policies and the expansion of free trade.18 Effective free trade policies require, next to the withdrawal of trade barriers, the elimination of obstacles originating from private restraints resulting from abuse of dominance, monopolization, import and export cartels, horizontal and vertical restraints, and other issues considered to be competition law violations.19 To achieve these results, the WTO urged developing countries to adopt competition rules, often US or EC type competition policies, while encouraging for time lags in the introduction of these different aspects of competition rules to be able to efficiently implement them. One can explain the WTO’s continuous attempt to influence, encourage, and facilitate the adoption of competition legislation in developing countries by its aspirations towards harmonizing competition laws to one day usher in universal competition policies under its umbrella.20 The WTO is repeatedly encouraging agreements on core antitrust principles as a first step towards the achievement of this goal.21 When developing countries adopt rules similar to those in more developed countries, the attempt at harmonization seems more realistic and at the same time the effects of global anticompetitive conduct with relation to trade can be better tackled. If laws adopted in developing countries were fundamentally different from those in the advanced world, the ability of the developed countries to protect their interests from anti-competitive practices in developing countries would be limited. Thereby, not only would similar competition laws encourage more effective free trade, but would also give a sense of security for FDIs and MNCs working in developed countries. One can also argue that it would give the host developing country more teeth to prosecute prohibitive conduct emanating from local or foreign entities, and to challenge harmful global mergers. The WTO is not alone in encouraging competition law adoption across the developing world. Several international financial institutions consider a competition policy dimension when evaluating country risk necessary for lending purposes.22 For example, the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the International Development Association (IDA) look at a country’s competition policy when assessing the situation of borrower countries before deciding to allocate the funds needed.23 A classic example is the case of Indonesia, where the country was required by the IMF to adopt a competition law in return for rescue money.24 It is worth noting that the first conditionality appeared in a World Bank industrial sector adjustment loan to Argentina in 1991.25Also, the United Nations and the OECD played a role in pushing for the adoption of competition laws across developing countries. Both institutions have adopted and promoted non-legally enforceable “codes of conduct” to prevent anticompetitive practices.26 The United Nations has also set up, under the rubric of the United Nations Commission for Trade and Development (UNCTAD) and the United National Economic and Social Commission for Western Asia (UNESCWA), several projects and initiatives that assist developing countries in the design and implementation of their competition policies.27 The increased interest of international and supranational bodies with regard to encouraging adoption of competition laws in the developing world originated in the wave of neoliberal reforms as part of the Washington consensus, which resulted in privatization and liberalization across developing countries. Some of the goals of these reforms were to put an end to government monopolies and governmental intervention in the economy through liberalizations and privatizations. However, the result of the wave of privatization was that government monopolies were simply replaced by private monopolies yielding the same anti-competitive effects.28 For the past two decades or more, the World Bank Group and other development organizations have encouraged developing and emerging market economies to adopt pro-competition measures such as trade and investment liberalization, privatization, and economic deregulation. These initiatives have been aimed primarily at reducing public sector policy-based barriers to entry, regulatory costs, and delays that unnecessarily constrain private sector economic activity . . . . They are, however, insufficient— they are complementary to but do not substitute for an effective competition law-policy. They do not address the private sector restrictive business practices that can significantly impede competition. Unchecked, anticompetitive practices by dominant and politically connected firms and vested interest groups can capture or significantly reduce the benefits that accrue from competition . . . . Competition does not arise or sustain itself automatically. The competitive process needs to be maintained, protected, and promoted to strengthen the development of a sound market economy. 29 Similar rhetoric was reproduced over and over, not only by these international organizations, but also by lawyers, economists, and policy makers. The result was that adopting competition rules became a priority on the agenda of economic growth in many less developed countries, who pushed forward with the help or pressure of various supranational institutions. Some countries, however, resisted the push to adopt competition laws and continued to prefer concentration to competition. They, thereby, had less of a drive to adopt competition laws based on their own initiatives. Others felt the need to adopt competition laws and to drive their markets towards the perfect competition ideal. Part of this desire was their belief in the rhetoric presented to them, but also due to the increased cross-border influences of anti-competitive practices,30 especially their import of cartel-affected goods.31 Trading partners have also requested the adoption of antitrust laws as a condition for signing free trade agreements.32 For example, the EU has been extremely active in the process of spreading its competition law to developing countries. This is to the extent where “some argue that today the EC competition law is the dominant model of competition law in the world.”33 Treaties, such as the Accession Agreements signed by Eastern European countries to join the EU34 or the Euro-Mediterranean partnership agreements signed by various non-European Mediterranean countries and the EU, oblige the signatories to adopt competition laws modeled on Article 101 (formally 81) and 102 (formally 82) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU).35 One of the studies on the adoption competition laws across countries suggests that “the impetus for adopting antitrust laws appears related to the imposed guidelines of supranational bodies, in particular the requirements of the European Union.”36 One reason why the EU has been actively involved in shaping the competition laws of developing countries could be the fact that the EU is an important trading partner and, therefore, it is eager to trade with countries that have similar laws. Another reason could be its race with the US on issues relating to harmonization of competition rules, whereby its influence on the competition laws of developing countries is an attempt to diffuse its laws, which could push the balance in its favor when negotiations on harmonized rules are underway. It is also worth noting that the EU is not the sole entity to require the adoption of competition laws in its bilateral trade agreements with developing countries. Many Free Trade Agreements have endorsed similar requirements, where parties to these agreements are required to have a domestic antitrust regime in place as one of the main conditions before entering into the agreement.37 Other bilateral and regional free trade agreements have also included chapters on competition policy.38 Finally, several nongovernmental organizations have also advocated the adoption of these laws and promoted assistance to countries in their implementation phases.39B. Development Hopes Associated with Adopting Competition Laws Development hopes have been crucial in the spread of competition laws. The direct impact of adopting competition laws on prosperity, economic growth, and development is often the reason furnished by these international institutions for developing countries to adopt these laws. The heightened interest in competition law adoption “suggests competition law is widely seen as a desirable and worthwhile economic policy.”40 Competition policy has often been regarded as a building block of economic development. A paper of the WTO Working Group described that: The specific benefits that have been attributed to such policy include promoting an efficient allocation of resources, preventing/addressing excessive concentration levels and resulting structural rigidities, addressing anti-competitive practices of enterprises . . . enhancing an economy’s ability to attract foreign investment and to maximize the benefits of such investment, reinforcing the benefits of privatization and regulatory reform initiating and establishing a focal point for the advocacy of pro-competitive reforms and a competition culture.41 The United Nations has also advocated, on many instances, that competition policy is a key ingredient for growth and development of nations.42 The same position has been taken by the OECD. One of its publications based on a survey of OECD members and non-members asserts that: There are strong links between competition policy and numerous basic pillars of economic development. . . . There is persuasive evidence from all over the world confirming that rising levels of competition have been unambiguously associated with increased economic growth, productivity, investment and increased average living standards.43 These kinds of assumptions are often backed by empirical studies showing that adopting competition laws lead to higher competition intensi-ties,44 which is automatically read to mean higher growth levels. The microeconomic fields of industrial organization and endogenous growth present ample material to show how competition is positively associated with growth. For example, one study argued that competition rules help sustain two of the fundamental ingredients of “economic growth: namely competitive markets and a sound legal system.”45 Another study stressed the fact that the adoption of competition policy is “positively correlated with the intensity of competition.”46 A further empirical study using multi-country regression analysis to explore the correlation between competition and growth rates found a “strong correlation between the effectiveness of competition policy and growth.”47 This study also illustrated that the effect of competition on growth is more than that of “trade liberalisation, institutional quality, and a general favourable policy environment.”48 This, however, was found to be predominantly true for Far Eastern countries and less so for other developing countries.49 Other proponents of the relationship between adopting competition laws and development argue that competition rules are a precondition to the implementation of successful privatization, especially if the goal of privatization is not the substitution of government monopolies by private ones.50 Similarly, another study concluded that liberalization alone does not lead to development since “non-tariff barriers to trade will replace tariffs that trade liberalization removes because of the political power of rent-seeking special interest groups.”51 Some also suggest that having competition legislation will deter corruption in transition economies, where “government bodies have tremendous power to affect the competitive process when they issue licenses, permits, franchises, and subsidies.”52 When these economies adopt competition laws some of the powers of government officials might be curbed and their responsiveness to bribes in order to facilitate illicit economic privileges might be reduced. This is assuming that the enforcers of the competition laws will not themselves be susceptible to bribes to avoid antitrust enforcement. Moreover, competition policy is considered essential for developing countries as a tool to increase foreign direct investment (FDI), which is considered essential for growth.53 Adopting antitrust laws creates a more transparent framework that increases investors’ reliance on the economy and reduces transaction costs.54 These are only some of the studies testing the relationship between competition law and development. It is important to note that most of the above-mentioned studies either test the correlation between adopting competition laws and development or between a proxy called “effectiveness of anti-monopoly policy”55 and development. This is drastically different from studying the relationship between enforcing the competition laws and development. The latter should be the measure used to ascertain whether competition laws lead to development or not. Studying enforcement instead of adoption will not necessarily lead to the same conclusions. Regardless, developing countries have found the promises of development and growth associated with the adoption of competition laws too hard to ignore. International organizations and academic studies presenting the positive relationship between competition laws and development were made readily available to developing countries. The studies have shown persuasive conclusions that developing countries eagerly accepted. At the same time, these nations encountered numerous challenges, some structurally due their own positions as developing countries and some related to the discourse that competition laws lead to development and growth. Both of these challenges are discussed next. III. THE OTHER SIDE OF THE COIN: CHALLENGES TO ANTITRUST ADOPTION This section addresses some of the recurrent challenges articulated in adopting a competition law. Some of these challenges are due to the idiosyncratic nature of developing countries, yet others are more general critiques to the merits of competition laws. A. Limited Resources Need Not Be Wasted on a Costly Competition Regime Developing countries face numerous challenges with regard to adopting and enforcing competition rules. At the outset, enacting competition legislation was not always considered a priority on their reform agendas. This is due to the high costs and low returns associated with adopting these rules compared to other reform-oriented policies, such as removing trade restrictions. One of the common arguments is that trade liberalization yields far greater prosperity than adopting laws that attack restraints of trade. The advocates of trade liberalization, as a substitute for antitrust, argue that the mere removal of trade obstacles, such as tariffs and barriers to entry, will effectively discipline domestic producers in transition economies.56 They support the notion that “[f]ree trade is, consequently, the best antitrust policy.”57 Also, the argument that “[f]ree trade stimulates wealth creation and development, and in a small country it makes antitrust concerns largely irrelevant,”58 has been made to caution against adoption competition laws. Another argument in favor of trade liberalization is that the limited public resources of transition economies would produce better outcomes if invested in initiatives improving the flow of goods. For example, improvement in infrastructure would give consumers access to an increased number of sellers.59 Similarly, it is argued that economic policy and competition law enforcement divert the scarce resources away from more important priorities on the path to reform and development. The famous quote from one of the fierce opponents to imposing competition laws on transition economies, Paul Godek, is worth noting: “[e]xporting antitrust to Eastern Europe is like giving a silk tie to a starving man. It is superfluous; a starving man has much more immediate needs. And if the tie is knotted too tightly, he will not be able to eat what little there is available to him.”60 B. Plenty of Reforms to Accommodate a Competition Enforcement Apparatus Are Needed Related to the criticism of spending scarce resources on adopting and enforcing competition laws is the claim that developing countries need also acquire, reform, or implement administrative apparatuses, effective judiciary and appeal systems, independent investigating authorities, and expertise.61 Most developing countries lack the aforementioned necessities to enforce antitrust laws. To improve the chances of effective antitrust implementation, developing countries need serious reforms in these areas. These are all costly endeavors that would deplete their resources further. In addition to these challenges, developing countries face further obstacles to competition enforcement due to the lack of data collection, which is especially necessary to define market shares. This is evident by the lack of effective “Statistics Offices” in public administrations that provide this information.62 The weakness of professional associations and consumer groups are also considered challenges that stand in the way of creating awareness and a competition culture that are essential to facilitate the smooth spread and implementation of these laws.63 Given these drawbacks in developing economies, what is ultimately feared is that the enforcement authority to be set up will not be able to apply the competition rules. It will lack the necessary funding, technical staff, and supporting environment to effectively enforce the law. It is also often argued, that in a developing country, an administrative body will often lack the necessary independence that is arguably critical for antitrust enforcement.64 C. Corruption, Government Intervention and Crony Capitalism Hamper Effective Competition Policy One of the critical challenges that face developing countries is the already high level of government interference in the economy, which is by default increased further when a competition law is adopted and enforced. The government intervention includes government-erected barriers to enter or exit the market,65 government monopolies, the various forms of subsidies granted by governments to loss-making enterprises,66 and government politicization of the administrative authorities in force of applying and enforcing the law. In most developing countries, governments play an active role in regulating and setting bureaucratic measures to be followed by firms to enter or exit the market, resulting in many instances in rigid barriers that cannot be surpassed. This in turn leads to rent-seeking behavior, cronyism, corruption, and favoritism.67 Adopting a competition law is arguably adding another layer of bureaucratic red tape that needs to be surpassed for firms to operate effectively. Similarly, this criticism amounts to the fear that competition policy will be a tool to provide disguised government control and hamper the growth of the often-fragile private sector. Developing countries also portray a unique political economy, where often government interests and those of the business elite are one and the same.68 This casts serious doubt on whether competition law enforcement will not be selectively used to create further obstacles to those players that are not part of this favored club. It may only entrench the powers of the incumbent firms and those that pay the highest rewards to the government apparatus.69 It is often argued that developing economies are enmeshed in a “Kafkaesque maze of control”70 where large family owners use their influence to limit competition and obtain finances from the government to alter the game in their favor.71 The poorly functioning capital markets in many developing countries furthers the concentrated ownership of the local elite even more. The fear is that incumbent firms use their rents to pay for such selective and biased enforcement, which can often not be matched by new entrants and small firms who want a piece of the pie.72 Incumbent firms want to maintain the status quo and resist any potential changes that might lower their influence and position in the market.73 Given this political economy “[a]ntitrust policies affected by political considerations may, however, come with a large price tag attached.”74 One of which is that “interest groups will follow their incentives and shift resources into monopolization through government protection. Lobbying the government for protection may be highly substitutable for organizing cartels.”75 In other words, producers and incumbents will now invest their rents in lobbying the government to continue their monopoly positions. Rodriguez and Williams argue that “the gain to interest groups of establishing cartels or price-fixing schemes are outweighed by simply soliciting preferential treatment from the state.”76 This implies that “antitrust may cause inefficiencies that are worse than the allocative losses that it is designed to defend against.”77 Such bureaucratic capture is assumed to make enforcers not able to serve the public interest.78 Nonetheless, arguments using interest group theory to qualify antitrust enforcement are not without their own critiques.79 Adding high levels of corruption to the mix, it is predictable that empowering the governments in developing countries with a competition law will lead to even more corruption spent to alter the game in the favor of the local elite and friends of the government at the expense of overall welfare. Such political and bureaucratic resistance is arguably among the main problems facing developing countries in terms of implementing their competition laws and creating a competition culture.8

#### Vote neg to affirm a pedagogy of mutual indebtedness. Academia and debate have set up a violent network of logistics that centralize discussion on securing the interests of empire before the interests of those subject to it. Mutual indebtedness reframes the linguistic economy of this space to question what assumptions and political boundaries regulate our relations, our alliance, and our resistance. As Bleiker puts it, voting neg acts as a generative moment that initiates

We who would see beyond seeing see only language, that burning field.1 Language is one of the most fundamental aspects of human life. It is omnipresent. It penetrates every aspect of transversal politics, from the local to the global. We speak, Heidegger stresses, when we are awake and when we are asleep, even when we do not utter a single word. We speak when we listen, read or silently pursue an occupation. We are always speaking because we cannot think without language, because ‘language is the house of Being’, the home within which we dwell.2 But languages are never neutral. They embody particular values and ideas. They are an integral part of transversal power relations and of global politics in general. Languages impose sets of assumptions on us, frame our thoughts so subtly that we are mostly unaware of the systems of exclusion that are being entrenched through this process. And yet, a language is not just a form of domination that engulfs the speaker in a web of discursive constraints, it is also a terrain of dissent, one that is not bound by the political logic of national boundaries. Language is itself a form of action – the place where possibilities for social change emerge, where values are slowly transformed, where individuals carve out thinking space and engage in everyday forms of resistance. In short, language epitomises the potential and limits of discursive forms of transversal dissent. This chapter provides the theoretical basis necessary to appreciate the far-reaching political and transversal potential that is entailed in everyday forms of dissent that engage the linguistic constitution of global politics. The subsequent, final chapter will then examine, through an additional reading of the events that led to the fall of the Berlin Wall, the practical potential of such dissident practices. To scrutinise the role of language in global politics is not simply to examine the clash of values between different national languages. Interactions between them, as for instance in translating activities at diplomatic summits, is of course a central aspect of international relations. But the political struggle over language also occurs in an array of other, far more subtle domains. Consider how a key event in global politics, such as the fall of the Berlin Wall, can be represented through different types of speech, each of which embodies a subjective but discursively objectified way of looking at the world. The turbulent events of 1989 can, for instance, be understood through the vocabulary of high politics, which revolves around great power relations and diplomatic negotiations; or through the vocabulary of strategic studies, which stresses military capacities, state repression and relations of coercive force; or through the vocabulary of international political economy, which places emphasis on market performances and their impact on political stability; or through the vocabulary of peace studies, which focuses on popular dissent and its ability to uproot systems of domination; or through the vocabulary of feminist theory, which illuminates the gendered dimensions of crumbling walls; or through the vocabulary of the common men and women in the street, which epitomises the daily frustrations of living in a suffocating society; or through any other vocabulary that expresses the subjective dimensions of interpreting events. In each case, though, the specific vocabulary that is used embodies and objectifies a particularly, discursively embedded world-view – one that is inherently political, even though it presents its view-points, often convincingly, as unbiased representations of the real. But all of these view-points, no matter how detached and impartial they seem, do more than merely interpret the events that led to the collapse of the Berlin Wall. In rendering it meaningful, they are not only describing and representing, they are actually intervening in the events.3 A sustained engagement with the philosophy of language is necessary to recognise the potential for transversal social change that is entailed in dissident practices that interfere with the linguistically entrenched objectification of global politics. This chapter is, of course, unable to survey this complex issue in an exhaustive way. The focus will rest with two authors, Nietzsche and Wittgenstein, who represent key elements of an approach that perceives language not as a way of representing the world, but as an activity, a way of life. An engagement with this approach serves to prepare the ground for a practical and more overtly political reading of language and its relation to transversal struggles. Language, then, is no longer seen as a mere medium of communication. It is also the very site where politics is carried out. Critiquing practices of global politics is thus a process that cannot be separated from critiquing the languages through which these practices have become normalised and objectified. To outline how such a rethinking of politics may engender human agency, this chapter focuses on dissident potentials that are entailed in the practice of writing, understood not in its narrow sense as a mere act of inscribing signs, but as everything which makes this act possible – in short, language itself.**[[3]](#footnote-3)**

#### Aff has posited an unhelpful binary that locks in debt as the only relationship between the US and the rest. Prefer an investigation of the ethico-political engagement with global alliance structures. This must begin with refusing to answer the question of whether the US should withdraw from its alliances.

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In unravelling the discursive certitudes of humanitarian intervention, the book has made three central arguments. The first concerns the political topography of intervention and R2P. I have challenged claims of spatial separation in which political territories are clearly demarcated, showing that the security practices of liberal states are now predicated on a deterritorialised network of surveillance, monitoring and border control in which borders are not obsolete but are highly differential in impact. The dominant geography of intervention is one predicated on separation and disconnection. This leads to a limited and limiting set of moral questions about the possibilities of intervention. There is an old joke about a tourist in Dublin who asks a local man for directions. The Irishman replies, “Well, if I were you I wouldn’t start from here.” The joke challenges the logic in what we perceive to be true. We often presume a simple linear causality in a chain of events because our view is blinkered to the wider context in which those events are produced. In the context of intervention, liberal claims of spatial demarcation are premised on a mythical conception of territorially-based political community that is little more than a convenient fiction. As a result, to the question “Should we intervene, or should we turn away?”, I would reply, “Well, if I were you I wouldn’t start from here.” What I mean by this is that our ethico-political engagement begins not at the moment at which military intervention is raised as a solution to mass-scale violence. Our ethico-political engagement with other people is an eternal and necessarily flawed relation of tolerance and acceptance of mutual vulnerability. In addressing humanitarian intervention differently, I suggest that we should refuse the questions ‘can intervention be morally justified?’ or ‘under what circumstances should we undertake military intervention?’ These questions are complicit in the acceptance and reproduction of a wide network of systemic violence of which intervention is one part. In this way, imaginative geographies and our ethico-political engagement with violence are inextricably linked. I have demonstrated that the imaginative geography of crisis through which intervention is justified reproduces Orientalist assumptions about the postcolonial other, positing him or her as either depoliticised and vulnerable, or as irrationally immature and violent. This reflects not an authentic truth, but a projection of the fears, assumptions and impulses of a liberal self that has been unable to shake the colonial mindset that it must destroy and rebuild in order to help the other. The knowledge of Orientalism is a distorted mirror of the collective unconscious rather than a window into another culture. In this way, violence is reproduced as the logical, rational and even benevolent response to disorder or crisis in the postcolonial world. This book disrupts claims of spatial separation by challenging both the deterritorialised security practices of liberal state (and privatised) power, and the imaginations of difference and otherness on which these practices rest. The assumption of spatial separation underlying claims of fighting ‘limited wars’ is a convenient lie that attempts to conceal a network of violence in the form of private security and increasingly militarised policing and immigration systems. This network relies upon and is sustained by its own imaginative geographies of the other as a threat who must be monitored, placed under surveillance, detained, and if necessary, deported. Any rational attempt to pinpoint this threat will result in failure, as the logic of the system is to reproduce itself with ever-increasing anxieties. The maintenance of the system itself becomes its central aim, and the ‘enemy’ within against which it is securing us disappears further into the shadows with every attempt to find it. Instead of positing an alternative moral imaginary with which to frame our response to crisis, the book has argued that the ways we commonly think about global politics and intervention are implicated in the reproduction of violence as a response to political unrest. The purpose of this argument is to reveal humanitarian intervention as a contingent instance in which violence is produced. To ask how it is produced is to highlight the fact that war is not an inevitable or enduring feature of international politics. If we accept that war is an ethico-political decision and not the duty of the powerful to uphold the normative order, then we can begin to think differently about our engagement with violence. The second primary claim of the book concerns a displacement in the ethical measurement of humanitarian war to a temporal plane. In other words, the success of intervention is measured not in terms of lives saved, or the extent of rebuilding and reconstruction after conflict, or even the humanitarian aid, but in the speed at which intervention is mobilised. A good war has become a quick war. The equation of speed with humanitarian or ethical success is a subtle shift, but a profoundly worrying one. It is enabled by what Virilio terms the ‘propaganda of progress’, in which increasingly swift and efficient technology has become the sole aim of capitalist societies. In this thirst for speed, wider reflection on the implications of technology is squeezed out of the discursive space for politics. Virilio argues that if this trend continues, the potential for politics itself will be annihilated. There are two important implications about this conflation of speed and ethics in humanitarian war. First, it enables the production of violence as a rational and desirable response to crisis. The superiority of the military technologies of intervening forces forms a key part of the representational conceit of intervention in which might and right are fused. The technological frame in which intervention is justified is a subtle one, particularly as interventions shift from the spectacular ‘shock and awe’ of the Gulf and Iraq wars to the increasingly invisible and technical ‘precision’ strikes of drone warfare at the margins of the ongoing ‘overseas contingency operation’.1 In post-Cold War interventions the technological and the humanitarian frames through which war is produced have become increasingly fused. The production of humanitarian war takes place on an assumption that our technologies have become so precise that we can fight a ‘clean’ war in which only the bad people get hurt. The second, related implication is that the technological frame alienates us from the material impact of its results. As the technological frame produces warfare that is better, cleaner and more precise, less attention is paid to the material and bodily impact of intervention’s violence. The danger is that we become so blinded by the advanced technologies of warfare that we forget that these technologies are still intended to result in destroyed buildings and strewn body parts. The declaration that the means of committing violence are increasingly precise and efficient makes violence more likely, as it is assumed that the messy impact of war can be avoided through advanced technology. The war in Libya, as every war, shows that the messy impact of war can never be avoided. In wars people will die, buildings will be destroyed and people will always be left to deal with the consequences of societal divisions, grieving families and weakened infrastructure. These mundane tasks will usually fall to the world’s poorest, and rarely to those who drop the bombs from a great height as part of a humanitarian intervention. The third central claim of the book is that humanitarian intervention depends upon, reproduces and perpetuates divisions and distinctions between people who are worthy of protection and those who may be killed. As reiterated above, the imaginative geography of intervention is one in which the postcolonial world is produced as failing or failed. The ‘propaganda of progress’ in which liberal war is celebrated as increasingly swift and efficient is also riven with a distinction between the technologically advanced and the marginalised targets of intervention who will either be killed or saved. The moral universe of intervention is one where people are divided according to legitimacy based upon a series of assumptions about race, gender, class, religion and nationality. Those deemed legitimate potential subjects are worthy of saving, but many others are seen as beyond the pale for liberalising interventions, and can be sacrificed without regret. This moral universe appears at first glance to run counter to a liberal cosmopolitanism that draws upon universalism and progressive teleology. However, these elements of liberalism create the foundation for distinctions between legitimate and illegitimate subjects. Liberalism creates a universal moral subject who is transcendent of his social context. This subject is a historical and theoretical artifice, born out of a need to create the basis for law and rights in modern Europe. It has served as justification for innumerable injustices across the world in European imperialism and colonialism, driven by a desire to impose this legal system on other peoples against their will. This was a legal system in which it was lawful to enslave and oppress and in which hierarchical authority and clearly delineated class divisions were sacrosanct. The book ties these three claims to the liberal thought at the basis of human rights claims in human security and humanitarian intervention. The universalism of liberalism rests upon a dualism between the irrationality of nature and the rationality of society and law. This dualism is at the heart of the idea of transcendence, in which the liberal subject stands above the lower, material realm of nature and the body in a transcendent plane of universal rational consciousness. The divide upon which liberal theorists constructed the edifice of universalism contains within it the potential to divide people between the legitimate and lawful, and the irrational and illegitimate. The effect of this is to temporalise difference as not only spatially distinct, but also as eternally and metaphysically inadequate. As I have shown in the case of Libya, this difference is violently policed through the various practices of security which include contemporary humanitarian intervention. Liberal thought, underpinned by universalism, dualism and progressive teleology, was allied to the pursuit of colonialism, with the wilful exploitation and enslavement of societies it entailed. This alliance between universal moral principles and the ruthless and violent policing of divisions between peoples appears to be a paradoxical interpretation of liberalism. Yet it represents not an aberration from liberal principles but their precise fulfilment, with humanitarian intervention following a line of practices from the spread of Christianity to development and peacebuilding. My argument here is not that no good can come from these practices, but that their alliance with violence, division and exploitation should give pause to those who believe themselves to be saviours of the word. The tragedy of history is not only that particular elites took it upon themselves to enforce universal moral principles with extreme violence in the rest of the world, but that they continue to do so.

### 2

#### CP Text: Jach’a marka mink’ai echay qanqa di istadus unidus.

#### It solves

Belcourt 17 (Billy-Ray Belcourt is from Driftpile Cree First Nation. He is a PhD student in the Department of English and Film Studies at the University of Alberta. “The Optics of the Language: How Joi T. Arcand Looks with Words.” 8-29-17. <https://canadianart.ca/features/optics-language-joi-t-arcand-looks-words/> //shree)

What did Bushby see? In his formulation, “one” brings into focus a sinister optic, where “optic” is the lens or filter by which one looks and from this looking ropes what is seen into an encounter humming with all sorts of potential. Bushby’s is an optic that mediates the interpellative call “one” seeks to enact—it is a part of the grammar of settler horror. “One” is thus a modality by which we, the ante-Canada, those of us who bear that which is prior to and beneath Canada, are racialized and roped into a representational field where all things, like trailer hitches, can be put to violent use. We cannot survive in the visual register of “one.” Words are worldly; not just in the sense that they proliferate and float up into the sky and become cloud-like. Words world too. Words like “one” incubate death-worlds (see Achille Mbembe’s 2003 essay “Necropolitics”) inside which those of us who look like Kentner are made to inhabit modes of enfleshment that fix the stares of the grim reapers of the present. On the other hand, some of us recruit words in the name of something like freedom. We might call this duality the double-bind of enunciation. How do we refuse a savage call to being with a more spacious one? Joi T. Arcand is a photo-based artist and industrial sculptor from Muskeg Lake Cree Nation, and she knows that words, that letter forms, shapes and glyphs, “change the visual landscape,” that they are how we go about practicing new ways of looking. Words are emotional architectures, and Arcand calls hers “Future Earth.” In her 2015 book The Argonauts, Maggie Nelson tends to a debate about whether words do or do not potentiate. She takes up a claim of a partner’s that words do nothing but nominalize, and what is left unnamed is subject to a host of horrors. Nelson, however, holds out more hope for words; she contends that they are “good enough,” that how one speaks makes all of the difference and that words can, following Deleuze, incite “the outline of a becoming.” Bushby’s angered vocalization of a genre of non-being—where “one” is the refusal of a name and the humanity that comes with it—is evidence of the terrible mechanics of language. But, it is in opposition to this linguistic state of killability, this metaphysics and rhetoric of coloniality, that Arcand articulates a grammar of subjectivity vis-à-vis the time and space of a native future. Here on Future Earth is a series of photographs that Arcand produced in 2010. In a phone interview, Arcand explained to me that this is where her photo-based practice and her interest in textuality synched. Arcand wants us to think about these photographs as documents of “an alternative present,” of a future that is within arm’s reach. For this series, Arcand manipulated signs and replaced their slogans and names with Cree syllabics. By doing this, Arcand images something of a present beside itself and therefore loops us into a new mode of perception, one that enables us to attune to the rogue possibilities bubbling up in the thick ordinariness of everyday life. Arcand wanted to see things “where they weren’t.” Hers is not a utopian elsewhere we need to map out via an ethos of discovery. Rather, Arcand straddles the threshold of radical hope. She asks us to orient ourselves to the world as if we were out to document or to think back on a future past. That is, Arcand rendered these photographs with a pink hue and a thick, round border, tapping into what she calls “the signifiers of nostalgia.” Importantly, these signifiers are inextricably bound to the charisma of words, to the emotional life of the syllabics. The syllabics are what enunciate; they potentiate a performance of world-making that does not belong to the mise-en-scene of settlement. It is this mise-en-scene of settlement that Arcand conjures to then obliterate, which is to say that her photographs evince a prairie world that is crowded with meaning, meaning that belongs differently to the logic of terra nullius (that a place exists without history or politics prior to European settlement) and to myths of Indian savagery and degeneracy. It is against this system of signs that Arcand opens the prairies up to radical resignification. It is where we build a future atop the decayed remains of coloniality. Perhaps Here on Future Earth visually captures the tempos of “Indian time,” which is always a scene of errant temporality. Indian time is less about the absence of rhythm and more about an inability to fix or to analytically hold up the rhythmic as a mode of feral movement itself. Words like “one” are spun such that they stomp us into the rut of social death. But: Indian time evinces an otherwise kinetics. In Here on Future Earth, this kinetics is energized by the textual, by the stories that they tell, and their visual culture. The modified signs exploit our ability to look; that we see them and conceptualize them as out of place or untimely is how we transport ourselves to a different time, to a place governed by Indian time. The syllabics themselves map a visual field. This is what Arcand calls “the optics of the language.” It is around these words that sociality orbits. This thematic persists in Arcand’s latest project, a set of large neon signs that light up Cree words like keyam. For Arcand, all of her engagements with the Cree language are partly elegiac. She is mourning language loss, but puts this negative affect to rebellious use to signify a world-to-come. Like the syllabics in Here on Future Earth, the bright signs prop up affective structures for a time and place where our relations to Cree are not always-already bound up in performances of grief. In one sign, Arcand translates the English phrase “I don’t have the words” into Cree. “I don’t have the words” is a paradoxical speech act; it uses words to announce their absence. These signs are installed in gallery spaces where Arcand’s work is commissioned; one was recently installed at the second gesture of the Wood Land School at the SBC Gallery of Contemporary Art in Montreal, another outside the Walter Phillips Gallery in Banff. These signs interrupt the visual terrain of the gallery, as if welcoming onlookers to a new world, to a new geographic form. The signs something like kinship around a common wordlessness in the service of a new world-making praxis. These photographs and signs, then, are all relics of a future past. They emerge from something of an anthropological interest in a future-in-the-present, in the affects of Indian time. Arcand thus writes the world wrong so that she can write it anew.

### 3

#### Colonialism necessitates genocide and symbolic death as war becomes a permanent relation

Harting 6 – Associate Professor of English at the University of Montreal (Heike, “Global Civil War and Post-colonial Studies,” from the Globalization and Autonomy Online Compendium, globalautonomy.ca/global1/servlet/Xml2pdf?fn=RA\_Harting\_GlobalCivilWar)

The Necropolitics of Global Civil War As with other civil wars, global civil war affects society as a whole. It "tends," as Hardt and Negri argue, "towards the absolute" (2004, 18) in that it polices civil society through elaborate security and surveillance systems, negates the rule of law, militarizes quotidian space, diminishes civil rights to the degree in which it increases torture, illegal incarceration, disappearances, and emergency regulations, and fosters a culture of fear, intolerance, and violent discrimination. Hardt and Negri, therefore, rightly argue that war itself has become "a permanent social relation" and thereby the "primary organizing principle of society, and politics merely one of its means or guises" (ibid., 12). What Hardt and Negri suggest is new about today's global civil war is its biopolitical agenda. "War," they write, "has become a regime of biopower, that is, a form of rule aimed not only at controlling the population but producing and reproducing all aspects of social life" (ibid., 13). For example, the biopolitics of war entails the production of particular economic and cultural subjectivities, "creating new hearts and minds through the construction of new circuits of communication, new forms of social collaboration, and new modes of interaction" (ibid., 81). The ambiguity of Hardt and Negri's notion of biopower subtly resides in their adaptation of the language of social and political revolution, for it seems to be the regime of biopower, rather than the multitude, that absorbs and transvalues the revolutionary, that is, anti-colonial, spirit inscribed in the rhetoric of "new hearts and minds." At the same time, they argue, that a biopolitical definition of war "changes war's entire legal framework" (ibid., 21-22), for "whereas war previously was regulated through legal structures, war has become regulating by constructing and imposing its own legal framework" (ibid. 22). If none of this, at least in my mind, is marked by a particular originality of thought, then this may have to do with Hardt and Negri's reluctance to address the historical continuities between earlier wars of decolonization and contemporary global wars, the legacies of imperialism, and the imperative of race in orchestrating imperial, neo-colonial, and today's global civil wars. In fact, while biopolitical global warfare might be a new phenomenon on the sovereign territory of the United States of America, specifically after 11 September 2001, it is hardly news to "people in the former colonies, who," as Crystal Bartolovich points out, "have long lived at the 'crossroads' of global forces" (2000, 136), violence, and wars. For example, in Sri Lanka global civil war has been a permanent, everyday reality since the country's Sinhala Only Movement in 1956, and become manifest in the normalization of racialized violence as a means of politics since President Jayawardene's election campaign for a referendum in 1982, which led to the state-endorsed anti-Tamil pogrom in 1983. Similarly, according to Achille Mbembe, biopolitical warfare was intrinsic to the European imperial project in "Africa," where "war machines emerged" as early as "the last quarter of the twentieth century" (2003, 33). In other words, although Hardt and Negri argue convincingly that it is the ubiquity of global war that restructures social relationships on the global and local level, their concept tends to dehistoricize different genealogies and effects of global civil war. Indeed, not only do Hardt and Negri refrain from reading wars of decolonization as central to the construction of what David Harvey sees as the uneven "spatial exchange relations" (2003, 31) necessary for the expansion of capital accumulation and of which global war is an intrinsic feature, but they also dissociate global civil wars from the nation-state's still thriving ability to implement and exercise rigorous regimes of violence and surveillance. As for the term's epistemological formation, global civil war has been sanitized and no longer evokes the conventional association of civil war with "insurrection and resistance" (Agamben 2005, 2). Instead, it has become the effect of a diffuse new sovereignty (i.e., Hardt and Negri's Empire), a sovereignty that no longer decides over but has itself become a disembodied, that is, denationalized and normalized, state of exception. Yet, to talk about the disembodiment of global war not only reinforces media-supported ideologies of high-tech precision wars without casualties, but it also represses narratives about the ways in which the modi operandi of global war come to be embodied differently in different sites of war. In her short story "Man Without a Mask" (1995), the Sri Lankan writer Jean Arasanayagam describes the global dimensions of a war that is usually considered an ethnic civil war restricted to internally competing claims to territorial, cultural, and national sovereignty between the country's Sinhalese and Tamil population. Told by an elite mercenary who clandestinely works for the ruling members of the government and leads a group of highly trained assassins, the story follows the thoughts of its narrator and contemplates the politicization of violence and death. As a mercenary and possibly an ex-SAS (British Special Air Service) veteran the Sri Lankan Government hired after the failure of the Indo-Lankan Accord, the narrator signifies the "privatization of [Sri Lanka's] war" (Tambiah 1996, 6) and, thus, the reign of a global free market economy through which the state hands over its institutions and services to private corporations, including its army, and profits from the unrestricted global and illegal trade in war technologies. Like a craftsman, the mercenary finds satisfaction in the precision and methodical cleanliness of his work, in being, as he says, "a hunter. Not a predator" in his ability to leave "morality" out of "this business" (Arasanayagam 1995, 98). He is an extreme and perverted version of what Martin Shaw describes as the " 'soldier-scholar,'???the archetype of the new [global] officer" (1999, 60). As a self-proclaimed "scholar or scribe" (ibid., 100), the mercenary plots maps of death. Shortly before he reaches his victim, a politician who underestimated the political ambition of his enemy, he comments that bullet holes in a human body comprise a new kind of language: "The machine gun splutters. The body is pitted, pricked out with an indecipherable message. They are the braille marks of the new fictions. People are still so slow to comprehend their meaning" (ibid., 100). These new maps or fictions of global war, I suggest, describe what Etienne Balibar calls ultra-objective and ultra-subjective violence and characterize how global civil war both generates bare life and manages and instrumentalizes death. According to Balibar, ultra-objective violence suggests the systematic "naturalization of asymmetrical relations of power" (2001, 27) brought about, for instance, by the Sri Lankan government's prolonged abuse of the Prevention of Terrorism Act, which, in the past plunged the country into a permanent state of emergency, facilitated the random arrest of and almost absolute rule over citizens, and thus created a culture of fear and a reversal of moral and social values. As the story clarifies, under conditions of systematic or ultra-objective violence, "corruption" becomes "virtue" and "the most vile" man wears the mask of the sage and "innocent householder" (Arasanayagam 1995, 102). In this milieu, the mercenary has no need for a mask, because he bears a face of ordinary violence that is "perfectly safe" (ibid., 102) in a society structured by habitual and systemic violence. But the logic of the "new fictions" of political violence is also ultra-subjective because it is "intentional" and has a "determinate goal" (Balibar 2001, 25), namely the making and elimination of what Balibar calls "disposable people" in order to generate and maintain a profitable global economy of violence. The logic of ultra-subjective violence presents itself through the fictions of ethnicity and identity as they are advanced and instrumentalized in the name of national sovereignty. The mercenary perfectly symbolizes what Balibar means when he writes that "we have entered a world of the banality of objective cruelty" (ibid.). For if the fictions of global violence are scratched into the tortured bodies of war victims, the mercenary's detached behavior dramatizes a "will to 'de-corporation'," that is, to force disaffiliation from the other and from oneself ??? not just from belonging to the community and the political unity, but from the human condition" (ibid.). In other words, while global civil war becomes embodied in those whom it negates as social beings and thereby reduces to mere "flesh," it remains a disembodied enterprise for those who manage and orchestrate the politics of death of global war. It is through the dialectics of the embodiment and disembodiment of global violence that the dehumanization of the majority of the globe's population takes on a normative and naturalized state of existence. Arasanayagam's short story also casts light on the limitations of Hardt and Negri's understanding of the biopolitics of global civil war, for the latter can account neither for the new fictions of violence in former colonial spaces nor for what Mbembe calls the "necropolitics" (2003, 11) of late modernity. Mbembe's term refers to his analysis of global warfare as the continuation of earlier and the development of new "forms of subjugation of life to the power of death" and its attendant reconfiguration of the "the relationship between resistance, sacrifice, and terror" (2003, 39). 4 Despite the many theoretical intersections of Hardt and Negri's and Mbembe's work, Mbembe's notion of necropolitics sees contemporary warfare as a species of such earlier "topographies of cruelty" (2003, 40) as the plantation system and the colony. Thus, in contrast to Hardt and Negri, Mbembe argues that the ways in which global violence and warfare produce subjectivities cannot be dissociated from the ways in which race serves as a means of both deciding over life and death and of legitimizing and making killing without impunity a customary practice of imperial population control. If global civil war is a continuation of imperial forms of warfare, it must rely on strategies of embodiment, that is, of politicizing and racializing the colonized or now "disposable" body for purposes of self-legitimization, specifically when taking decisions over the value of human life. After all, on a global level, race propels the ideological dynamics of ethnic and global civil war, while, on the local plane, it serves to orchestrate the brutalization and polarization of the domestic population, reinforcing and enacting patterns of racist exclusion and violence on the non-white body. In contrast to Hardt and Negri, then, Mbembe invites us to articulate imperial genealogies for the necropolitics of today's global civil wars. In other words, if imperialism was a form of perpetual low-intensity global war, the biopolitics of imperialism aimed at creating different forms of subjectivization. For example, while in India, the imperial administration sought to create a functional class of native informants, in Africa and the Caribbean, the British Empire created the figure of homo sacer. The latter, as Agamben argues, refers to the one who can be killed but not sacrificed. Homo sacer, Agamben clarifies, constitutes "the originary exception in which human life is included in the political order in being exposed to an unconditional capacity to be killed" (1998, 85). Thus, the native is included in the imperial order only through her exclusion, while, simultaneously her humanity is stripped of social life and transformed into bare life, ready to be commodified on slavery's auction blocs and foreclosed from the dominant imperial psyche. Agamben's understanding of bare life derives from his reading of the Nazi death camps as the paradigmatic space of modernity in which the distinction between "fact and law" (ibid., 171), "outside and inside, exception and rule, licit and illicit" (ibid., 170) dissolves and in which biopolitics takes the place of politics and "homo sacer" replaces the "citizen" (ibid., 171). While the notion of bare life is instrumental for theorizing biopolitics and the normalization and legalization of state violence under the pretense of, for example, protective arrests and preemptive strikes, it also suggests that the human body can be read as pure matter or in empirical terms. What goes unnoticed is to what extent the production of bare life depends on ideologies of race, that is, on the racialization of bodies, citizenship, and the concept of the human. For instance, under imperial rule, bare life is subjected to death and its politics in ways slightly different from those suggested by Agamben. More specifically, the killing of natives or slaves as bare life ??? then and today, as Rwanda's race-based genocide clarifies ??? not only configures human life in terms of its "capacity to be killed" (Agamben 1998, 114), that is as homicide and genocide outside of law and accountability, but also measures the value of human life on grounds of race. The making of bare life is a racialized and racializing process rooted within the necropolitics of colonialism. For, killing the native or slave presupposes the remaking of the human into bare life both through ideologies of pseudo-scientific racism and by subjecting them to what Orlando Patterson calls the "social death" (1982, 38) of the slave, that is, to a symbolic death of the human as a communal and social being that precedes physical death. 5 Thus, imperialism's necropolitics involves the making of disposable lives through practices of zombification and the "redefinition of death" itself (Agamben 1998, 161). In this sense, imperialism not only facilitated the extreme forms of racialized violence characteristic of global civil war, but it also helped create the conditions for making bare life the acceptable state of being for the present majority of the globe's population. Not unlike Jean Arasanayagam's short story, Mbembe's account of the Rwandan genocide and the Palestinian intifada suggests that the new global subjectivities are not so much the networked multitude Hardt and Negri imagine. Rather, emerging from the "new fictions" of global war, they are the suicide bomber, the mercenary, the martyr, the child soldier, the victim of mass rape, the refugee, the woman dispossessed of her family and livelihood, the mutilated civilian, and the skeleton of the disappeared and murdered victims of global civil war. What these subjectivities witness is that, on one hand, living under conditions of global civil war means to live in "permanent???pain" (Mbembe 2003, 39) and, on the other hand, they refer back to the dialectical mechanisms of colonial violence. For under the Manichaean pressures of colonialism, colonial violence always inaugurates a double process of subjection and subject formation. Frantz Fanon famously argues that anti-colonial violence operates historically on both collective and individual subject formation. For, on the one hand, "the native discovers reality [colonial alienation] and transforms it into the pattern of this customs, into the practice of violence and into his plan for freedom" (1963, 58), and on the other, a violent "war of liberation" instills in the individual a sense of "a collective history" (ibid., 93). Thus, as Robert Young suggests, anti-colonial violence "functions as a kind of psychotherapy of the oppressed" (2001, 295). Yet, it seems that read through the necropolitics of imperialism, global civil warfare no longer aims at the "pacification" of the colonial subject or the "degradation" of the "postcolonial subject" (ibid., 293) but, as I suggested earlier, at the complete abolishment of the human per se. We may therefore say that if global civil war produces new subjectivities, it does so through, what I have referred to as a process of zombification. Understood as sustained acts of negation, zombification ??? a term that harks back to Fanon ??? refers to a dialectical process of the embodiment and disembodiment of global war. The former refers to the exercise of ultra-objective violence ??? that is, the systematic "naturalization of asymmetrical relations of power" (Balibar 2001, 27) ??? in order to regulate, racialize, and extinguish human life at will, while the latter suggests the production of narratives of "de-corporation" (ibid., 25) and detachment by those who manage and administrate global civil war. The notion of zombification, however, connotes not only the exercise of, but also the exorcism of, the ways in which global war is scripted on and through the racialized body. Thus, a post-colonial understanding of global war needs to think through the necropolitics of war, including the uneven value historically and presently assigned to human life and the politicization of death. The latter issue will be addressed in the last section of this paper. The next section examines the cultural production and perpetuation of normative narratives of global warfare. The Rhetoric of the Archaic and Michael Ondaatje's "Anil's Ghost" Published shortly after Sri Lanka's civil war became entangled with the global politics of the South and the rise of the Sri Lankan nation-state to one of the war's principal and most corrupt actors, Ondaatje's novel Anil's Ghost dramatizes both the transformation of the country's civil war into a permanent state of exception and the failure of global non-governmental organizations (NGOs) to intervene in the war's rising human rights abuses and violent excesses. While the novel presents an extraordinary search for social justice through narrative and seeks to understand the operative modes of violence beyond their historical and social configurations, it also tends to sublimate and aestheticize violence by treating it as a normative element of human and, indeed, planetary life. My purpose here is to indicate that the novel's own project of dramatizing the complicity between religious and secular, anti-colonial and nationalist agents of war, and civilians and global actors (i.e., NGOs) remains compromised by the novel's aesthetic investment in a particular rhetoric of the archaic. The latter, I argue, unwittingly coincides with normative narratives of global war and facilitates the reader's detachment from the ways in which the Global North has reconstructed global life as a permanent state of exception. Ondaatje's novel (2000) opens with an Author's Note that locates the narrative at a time when "the antigovernment insurgents in the south and the separatist guerrillas in the north???had declared war on the government" and "legal and illegal government squads were???sent out to hunt down" both groups. In this instance, the Hobbesian rhetoric of a "war of all against all" is more than a clich??. In fact, it is symptomatic of the novel's ambiguous critique of the role of the Sri Lankan nation-state and its elaborate, modernist discourse of violence. The Note foreshadows what the narrator later repeats on several occasions, namely that Sri Lanka's war is a war fought "for the purpose of war" (ibid., 98) and for which "[t]here is no hope of affixing blame" (ibid., 17). In short, the "reason for war was war" (ibid., 43). At first glance, the narrative's emphasis on the war's self-perpetuating dynamics implies a Hobbesian understanding of violence as the natural state of human existence. At the same time, it translates the actual politics of Sri Lanka's war into the Deleuzean idiom of the "war machine." For, according to Deleuze and Guattari, armed conflict functions outside the control and accountability of the "state apparatus???prior to its laws" (1987, 352), and beyond its initial causes. Although such an interpretation of Sri Lanka's war reflects what the political scientist Jayadeva Uyangoda calls the "intractability of the Sri Lankan crisis" (1999, 158), its political and ethical stakes outweigh its gains. 6 To begin with, the novel's leitmotif of "perpetual war" situates Sri Lanka's conflict within a general context of global war, because, as the narrator reports, it is fought with "modern weaponry," supported by "backers on the sidelines in safe countries," and "sponsored by gun-and drug-runners" (Ondaajte 2000, 43). In this scenario, the rule of law has deteriorated into "a belief in???revenge" (ibid., 56), and the state is either absent or part of the country's all-consuming anarchy of violence. This absence suggests that the state no longer functions, in Max Weber's famous words, as "a human community that (successfully) claims the monopoly of the legitimate use of physical force within a given territory" (2002, 13). It is of course possible to argue that the novel's critique of the Sri Lankan nation-state lies in its absence. It seems to me, however, that the narrative's tendency to locate the dynamics of Sri Lanka's war outside the state and within a post-national vision of a new global order generates a normative narrative of global war. On the one hand, it resonates with the popular ??? though misleading ??? notion that the "appearance of 'failed states'," as Samuel Huntington argues in his controversial study The Clash of Civilizations, intensifies "tribal, ethnic, and religious conflict" and thus "contributes to [the] image of a world in anarchy" (1996, 35). On the other, situating Sri Lanka's war outside the institutions of the state re-inscribes a Hobbesian notion of violence that helps legitimize and cultivate structural violence as a permissive way of conducting politics. Such a reading of violence, however, overlooks that in a global context violence has become "profoundly anti-Hobbesian" (Balibar 2001, xi). Balibar usefully suggests that the twentieth century history of extreme violence has made it impossible to regard violence as "a structural condition that precedes institutions." Instead, he maintains, "we have had to accept???that extreme violence is not post-historical but actually post-institutional." It "arises from institutions as much as it arises against them" (ibid., xi). Thus, in such popular post-colonial narratives of war as Anil's Ghost, the normalization of violence figures as a forgetting of the institutional entrenchment and historical use of violence as a state-sanctioned political practice. If Ondaatje's novel presents Sri Lanka's war as an "inherently violent" event (Das 1998), it is also an event narrated through the symbolism and logic of archaic primitivism. For example, in the novel's central passage on the nature of human violence, the narrator observes, "The most precisely recorded moments of history lay adjacent to the extreme actions of nature or civilisation ???Tectonic slips and brutal human violence provided random time-capsules of unhistorical lives???A dog in Pompeii. A gardener in Hiroshima" (Ondaatje 2002, 55). The symbolic leveling of the arbitrariness of primordial chaos and the apparently ahistorical anarchism of violence create a rhetoric of the archaic that is characteristic, as Nancy argues, of "anything that is properly to be called war" (2000, 128). He convincingly argues that archaic symbolism "indicates that [war] escapes from being part of 'history' understood as the progress of a linear/or cumulative time" and can be rearticulated as no more than a "regrettable" remnant of an earlier age (ibid., 128). In that, Nancy's observation coincides with Hardt and Negri's that the "war on terror" employs a medievalist rhetoric of just and unjust wars that moralizes rather than legitimizes the use of global violence by putting it outside the realm of reason and critique. In Nancy's observation, however, two things are at stake. First, what initially appears to be a postmodern critique of the grand narratives of history in fact demonstrates that a non-linear account of history may lend itself to the transformation of extreme violence into exceptional events. In this way violence is normalized as a transhistorical category that fails to address the unequal political and economic relations of power, which lie at the heart of global war

s. Second, Nancy rightly warns us against treating war as an archaic relic that is "tendentiously effaced in the progress and project of a global humanity" (2000, 128). For not only does war return in the process of negotiating sovereignty on a global and local plane, but the representation of war in terms of archaic images also repeats a primordialist explanation of what are structurally new wars. As theorists such as Appadurai and Kaldor have argued, the primordialist hypothesis of global wars merely reinforces those mass mediated images of global violence that dramatize ethnic wars as pre-modern, tribalist forms of strife. Huntington's notion of civilization or "fault-line" wars as communal conflicts born out of the break-up of earlier political formations, demographic changes, and the collision of mutually exclusive religions and civilizations presents the most prominent and politically influential version of a primordialist and bipolar conceptualization of global war. In contrast to Huntington's approach, however, the narrative of Anil's Ghost contends that all forms of violence "have come into their comparison" (Ondaatje 2000, 203). Notwithstanding its universalizing impetus, the novel thus insists on the impossibility to think the nation and a new global order outside the technologies of violence and modernity. Indeed, in the novel's narrative it is the suffering of all war victims that "has come into their comparison" and suggests that the new wars breed a culture of violence that shapes everyone's life yet for which no one appears to be accountable. On the one hand, then, the novel's self-critical humanitarian project seeks to initiate a communal and individual process of mourning by naming, and therefore accounting for, in Anil's words, "the unhistorical dead" (ibid, 56). On the other hand, read as its critical investment in the war's politics of complicity, the novel's humanitarian endeavor is countered by the narrator's tendency to articulate violence in archaic and anarchistic terms. For, to revert to the symbolic language of "primitivism and anarchy" and "to treat [the new wars] as natural disasters," as Kaldor observes (2001, 113), designates a common way of dealing with them. Thus the rhetoric of the archaic not merely dehistoricizes violence but contributes to the making of a normative and popular imaginary through which to make global wars thinkable and comprehensible. Thus, their violent excesses appear to be rooted in primordialist constructions of the failed post-colonial nation-state rather than a phenomenon with deep-seated roots in the global histories of the present. Such a normative imaginary of global war is produced for the Global North so as to dehistoricize its own position in the various colonial processes of nation formation and global economic restructuring of the Global South. In this way, as Ondaatje's novel equally demonstrates, the Global North can detach itself from the Global South and create the kind of historical and cultural distance needed to accept ultra-objective violence as a normative state of existence. Conceptualizing war as a phenomenon of criminal and anarchistic violence, however, may do more than merely conform to the popular imagination about the chaotic and untamable nature of contemporary warfare. Indeed, anarchistic notions of violence tend to compress the grand narratives and petite recits of history into a total, singular present of perpetual uncertainty, fear, and political confusion and generate what the post-colonial anthropologist David Scott sees as Sri Lanka's "dehistoricized" history. Given the important role the claiming of ancient Sinhalese and Hindu history played in the violent identity politics that drive Sri Lanka's war, Scott suggests that devaluing or dehistoricizing history as a founding category of Sri Lanka's narrative of the nation breaks the presumably "natural???link between past identities and the legitimacy of present political claims" (1999, 103). This strategy seems useful because it uncouples Sri Lanka's colonially shaped and glorified Sinhalese past from its present claims to political power. We need to note, however, that, according to Scott, dehistoricizing the past does not suggest writing from a historical vacuum. Rather, it refers to a process of denaturalizing and, thus, de-legitimizing the normative narratives of ethnicized and racialized narratives of national identity. Anil's Ghost engages in this process of "dehistoricizing" by foregrounding the fictitious and fragmented, the elusive and ephemeral character of history. Indeed, as the historian Antoinette Burton suggests, the novel offers "a reflection on the continued possibility of History itself as an exclusively western epistemological form" (2003, 40). The latter clearly finds expression in what Sarath's brother, Gamini, condemns as "the last two hundred years of Western political writing" (Ondaatje 2000, 285). Steeped in the imperial project of the West, such writing is facilitated by and serves to erase the figure of the non-European cultural Other in order to produce and maintain what Jacques Derrida famously called the "white mythology" (1982, 207) of Western metaphysics. The novel usefully extends its reading of violence into a related critique of knowledge production, so that the latter becomes legible as being complicit in the production of perpetual violence and war. This critique is perhaps most articulated through the character of Palipana, Sarath's teacher and Sri Lanka's formerly renowned but now fallen anthropologist. Once an agent of Sri Lanka's anti-colonial liberation movement, Palipana represents the generation of cultural nationalist who sought history and national identity in an essentially Sinhalese culture and natural environment. Rather than employing empirical and colonial methods of knowledge production and historiography, Palipana had left the path of scientific objectivity, tinkered with translations of historical texts, and "approached runes???with the pragmatic awareness of locally inherited skills" (Ondaatje 2000, 82) until "the unprovable truth emerged" (ibid., 83). Now, years after his fall from scientific grace, Palipana lives the life of an ascetic, following the "strict principles of" a "sixth-century sect of monks" (ibid., 84). To him, history and nature have become one, for "all history was filled with sunlight, every hollow was filled with rain" (ibid., 84). Yet, Ondaatje's construction of Palipana and his account of the eye-painting ritual of a Buddha statue ??? a ritual that assumes a central place in the novel's cosmopolitan vision of artisanship as a practice of cultural and religious syncretism in the service of post-conflict community building ??? are themselves built on a number of historical texts listed in the novel's "Acknowledgment" section. As Antoinette Burton astutely observes, "the orientalism of some of the texts on Ondaatje's list is astonishing, a phenomenon which suggests the ongoing suppleness of 'history' as an instrument of political critique and ideological intervention" (2003, 50). Rather than effectively "dehistorizing" the character of Palipana, then, Ondaatje bases this character and the eye-painting ceremony on a central Sri Lankan modernist text, Ananada K. Coomaraswamy's Mediaeval Sinhalese Art (1908/1956). Cont For Hardt and Negri, then, the state of exception functions as the universal condition and legitimization of global civil war, while positioning the United States as a global power, which transforms war "into the primary organizing principle of society" (2004, 12). They rightly observe that the state of exception blurs the boundaries between peace and war, violence and mediation. Yet, curiously enough, Hardt and Negri's understanding of the state of exception largely emphasizes the concept's regulatory and pragmatic politics, so that the United States emerges as a sovereign power on grounds of its ability to decide on the state of exception. By exempting itself from international law and courts of law, protecting its military from being subjected to international control, allowing preemptive strikes, and engaging in torture and illegal detention (ibid., 8), the United States instrumentalizes and maintains war as a state of exception in the name of global security and thus seeks to consolidate its hegemonic role within Empire. Although Hardt and Negri openly disagree with Agamben's reading of the state of exception as defining "power itself as a 'monopoly of violence' " (2004, 364), it seems to me that Agamben's theory of the state of exception, as put forward in Homo Sacer rather than in States of Exception, might be usefully read alongside Hardt and Negri's crucial claim that global civil war as well as resistance movements depend on the "production of subjectivity" through immaterial labour (2000, 66). What this argument overlooks is that, according to Agamben, the state of exception constitutes an abject space or "a zone of indistinction between outside and inside, exclusion and inclusion" (1998, 181), where subjectivity enters a political and legal order solely on grounds of its exclusion. Moreover, the sovereign ??? albeit a nation, sovereign power, or global network of power ??? can only transform the rule of law into the force of law by suspending the legal system from a position that is simultaneously inside and outside the law. Through these mechanisms of exclusion and contradiction, subjectivity is not so much created as it is deprived of its social and political relationships. Thus the "originary activity" of global civil war is the violent conflation of political and social relationship and thereby the "production of bare life" (ibid., 83), of life that need not be accounted for, as is the case with the civilian casualties of the US-led war against Iraq. The state of exception, however, also figures as a prominent concept in post-colonial theory, for it raises questions not only about the ways in which we configure the human but also how we understand imperial or global war. In 1940, Benjamin famously wrote, "the tradition of the oppressed teaches us that the 'state of emergency' in which we live is not the exception but the rule. We must attain to a conception of history that is in keeping with this insight" (1968, 257). Benjamin's statement, as Homi Bhabha reminds us half a century later in his essay "Interrogating Identity," can be usefully advanced for a critical analysis of the dialectical ??? if not revolutionary ??? relationship between oppression, violence, and anti-colonial historiography. Indeed, "the state of emergency," as Bhabha says, "is also always a state of emergence" (1994, 41). Read in the context of today's global state of exception, namely the recurrence and intensification of ethnic civil wars across the globe and the coincidence of democratic and totalitarian forms of political rule, Bhabha's statement entails a number of risks and suggestions for a post-colonial historiography of global civil war. First, Bhabha's notion of emergency/emergence reflects his critical reading of Fanon's vision of national identity and thus reconsiders the state of emergency as a possible site of "the occult instability where the people dwell" (Fanon 1963, 227) and give birth to popular movements of national liberation. In this context, the state of exception might be understood as both constitutive to the alienation that is intrinsic to liberation movements and instrumental for a radical euphoria and excessive hope that create and spectralize the post-colonial nation-state as a deferred promise of decolonization. It is through this perspective that we can critically evaluate Hardt and Negri's endorsement of what they call "democratic violence" (2004, 344). This kind of violence, they argue, belongs to the multitude. It is neither creative nor revolutionary but used on political rather than moral grounds. When organized horizontally, according to democratic principles of decision making, democratic violence serves as a means of defending "the accomplishments" of "political and social transformation" (ibid., 344). Notwithstanding the concept's romantic and utopian inflections, democratic violence also derives from Hardt and Negri's earlier argument that "the great wars of liberation are (or should be) oriented ultimately toward a 'war against war,' that is, an active effort to destroy the regime of violence that perpetuates our state of war and supports the systems of inequality and oppression." This, they conclude, is "a condition necessary for realizing the democracy of the multitude" (ibid., 67). In one quick stroke, Hardt and Negri move anti-colonial liberation wars into their post-national paradigm of Empire and divest them of their cultural and historical particularities. Moreover, translating explicitly national liberation movements into a universalizing narrative of global pacifism precludes a critique of violence within its particular historical and philosophical formation. In contrast, a post-colonial analysis of global war must tease out the intersections between the ways in which racialized violence constitutes colonial and post-colonial processes of nation formation and helps construct an absolute enemy through which to legitimize global war and to abdicate responsibility for the dehumanizing effects of global economic restructuring. Second, while Bhabha's pun is symptomatic of the resisting properties that he sees as operative in the various practices of colonial ambiguity, it also, despite Benjamin's opinion, draws attention to the possibility that oppression alters the linear flow of Western history and challenges "the transparency of social reality, as a pre-given image of human knowledge" (Bhabha 1994, 41). Here, Bhabha rightfully asks to what extent do states of emergency or acts of extreme violence constitute a historical rupture and, more importantly, call into question the nature of the human subject. It is at this point that a post-colonial reading of the state of exception fruitfully coincides with Agamben's notion of exception. For in both cases, the focus of inquiry is the construction of disposable life through the logic of necropower and the collapse of social and political relationships that enable the exercise of particularly racialized forms of violence, including torture and disappearances. Third, Bhabha's notion of the double movement of emergency and emergence envisions an anti-colonialist historiography in terms of a dialectical process of perpetual transformation. It is at this point, however, that the coupling of emergency or exception and emergence becomes problematic for at least two reasons. First, combining both terms prematurely translates the violence of the political event into that of metaphor and risks erasing the micro- or quotidian narratives of violence ??? such as Arasanayagam's account of war ??? that both legitimate and are perpetuated by political and social states of emergency. In order to examine the relationship between global and communal forms of violence, a critical practice of post-colonial studies, I suggest, must reassess the term "transformation" and, concurrently, the assumption that acts of extreme global violence can be advanced in the service of "making history" (Balibar 2001, 26). In other words, if, as Hannah Arendt argues, there has been a historical "reluctance to deal with violence as a separate phenomenon in its own right" (2002, 25), it is time to examine the possibility of employing post-colonial studies in the service of a non-dialectical critique of global war. This kind of critique must ask to what extent those on whose bodies extreme violence was exercised are a priori excluded from articulating any transformative theory of violence. How, in other words, does bare life ??? if at all possible ??? attain the status of subjectivity within the dehumanizing logic of exception or global civil war? Fourth, like Bhabha, we need to take seriously Benjamin's insight into the intrinsic relationship between violence and the conceptualization of history. Notwithstanding Bhabha's pivotal argument that the violence of a "unitary notion of history" generates a "unitary," and therefore extremely violent, "concept of man" (1994, 42), I wish to caution, alongside Benjamin's analysis of fascism, that what enables today's global civil war is that even "its opponents treat it as a historical norm" (Benjamin 1968, 257). What is at stake, then, in dominant as well as critical narratives of global civil war is their representation as natural rather than political phenomena, and the acceptance of globalization as a political fait accompli. Both of these aspects, I believe, contribute to the proliferation of dehistoricized concepts of the global increase of racialized violence and war. It seems to me, however, that the enormous rise of violence inflicted by global civil wars requires a post-colonial historiography and critique of global war that questions notions of history based on cultural fragmentation, rupture, and totalization. Instead, such a historiography must seek out patterns of connection and connectivity. But more importantly, as I have argued in this paper, it must trace the post-colonial moment of global civil war and begin to read contemporary war through the interconnected necropolitics of global and imperial warfare. Thus, to understand the logic and practice of global war we need to develop a greater understanding precisely of those civil wars and national liberation wars that do not appear to threaten the new global order. Furthermore, a post-colonial critique of global civil war should facilitate the decoding and rescripting of both the normalizing narratives and racialized embodiment of global civil warfare.

#### “Extinction” operates as a narrative trope that disavows settler colonialism – rational appeals to geopolitical conflict inscribes social death through appeals to white vulnerability

Dalley 16

(Hamish, Assistant Professor of World Literature at Daemen College, Amherst,“The deaths of settler colonialism: extinction as a metaphor of decolonization in contemporary settler literature,” Settler Colonial Studies, accessed 11-15-16 //Bosley)

Settlers love to contemplate the possibility of their own extinction; to read many contemporary literary representations of settler colonialism is to find settlers strangely satisfied in dreaming of ends that never come. This tendency is widely prevalent in English-language representations of settler colonialism produced since the 1980s: the possibility of an ending–the likelihood that the settler race will one day die out–is a common theme in literary and pop culture considerations of colonialism’s future. Yet it has barely been remarked how surprising it is that this theme is so present. For settlers, of all people, to obsessively ruminate on their own finitude is counterintuitive, for few modern social formations have been more resistant to change than settler colonialism. With a few exceptions (French Algeria being the largest), the settler societies established in the last 300 years in the Americas, Australasia, and Southern Africa have all retained the basic features that define them as settler states–namely, the structural privileging of settlers at the expense of indigenous peoples, and the normalization of whiteness as the marker of political agency and rights–and they have done so notwithstanding the sustained resistance that has been mounted whenever such an order has been built. Settlers think all the time that they might one day end, even though (perhaps because) that ending seems unlikely ever to happen. The significance of this paradox for settler-colonial literature is the subject of this article. Considering the problem of futurity offers a useful foil to traditional analyses of settler-colonial narrative, which typically examine settlers’ attitudes towards history in order to highlight a constitutive anxiety about the past–about origins. Settler colonialism, the argument goes, has a problem with historical narration that arises from a contradiction in its founding mythology. In Stephen Turner’s formulation, the settler subject is by definition one who comes from elsewhere but who strives to make this place home. The settlement narrative must explain how this gap–which is at once geographical, historical, and existential–has been bridged, and the settler transformed from outsider into indigene. Yet the transformation must remain constitutively incomplete, because the desire to be at home necessarily invokes the spectre of the native, whose existence (which cannot be disavowed completely because it is needed to define the settler’s difference, superiority, and hence claim to the land) inscribes the settler’s foreignness, thus reinstating the gap between settler and colony that the narrative was meant to efface.1 Settler-colonial narrative is thus shaped around its need to erase and evoke the native, to make the indigene both invisible and present in a contradictory pattern that prevents settlers from evermoving on from the moment of colonization.2As evidence of this constitutive contradiction, critics have identified in settler-colonial discourse symptoms of psychic distress such as disavowal, inversion, and repression.3Indeed, the frozen temporality of settler-colonial narrative, fixated on the moment of the frontier, recalls nothing so much as Freud’s description of the ‘repetition compulsion’ attending trauma.4As Lorenzo Veracini puts it, because: ‘settler society’ can thus be seen as a fantasy where a perception of a constant struggle is juxtaposed against an ideal of ‘peace’ that can never be reached, settler projects embrace and reject violence at the same time. The settler colonial situation is thus a circumstance where the tension between contradictory impulses produces long-lasting psychic conflicts and a number of associated psychopathologies. Current scholarship has thus focused primarily on settler-colonial narrative’s view of the past, asking how such a contradictory and troubled relationship to history might affect present-day ideological formations. Critics have rarely considered what such narratological tensions might produce when the settler gaze is turned to the future. Few social formations are more stubbornly resistant to change than settlement, suggesting that a future beyond settler colonialism might be simply unthinkable. Veracini, indeed, suggests that settler-colonial narrative can never contemplate an ending: that settler decolonization is inconceivable because settlers lack the metaphorical tools to imagine their own demise.6This article outlines why I partly disagree with that view. I argue that the narratological paradox that defines settler-colonial narrative does make the future a problematic object of contemplation. But that does not make settler decolonization unthinkable per se; as I will show, settlers do often try to imagine their demise–but they do so in a way that reasserts the paradoxes of their founding ideology, with the result that the radical potentiality of decolonization is undone even as it is invoked. I argue that, notwithstanding Veracini’s analysis, there is a metaphor via which the end of settler colonialism unspools–the quasi-biological concept of extinction, which, when deployed as a narrative trope, offers settlers a chance to consider and disavow their demise, just as they consider and then disavow the violence of their origins. This article traces the importance of the trope of extinction for contemporary settler-colonial literature, with a focus on South Africa, Canada, and Australia. It explores variations in how the death of settler colonialism is conceptualized, drawing a distinction between historio-civilizational narratives of the rise and fall of empires, and a species-oriented notion of extinction that draws force from public anxiety about climate change–an invocation that adds another level of ambivalence by drawing on ‘rational’ fears for the future (because climate change may well render the planet uninhabitable to humans) in order to narrativize a form of social death that, strictly speaking, belongs to a different order of knowledge altogether. As such, my analysis is intended to draw the attention of settler-colonial studies toward futurity and the ambivalence of settler paranoia, while highlighting a potential point of cross-fertilization between settler-colonial and eco-critical approaches to contemporary literature. That ‘extinction’ should be a key word in the settler-colonial lexicon is no surprise. In Patrick Wolfe’s phrase,7 settler colonialism is predicated on a ‘logic of elimination’ that tends towards the extermination – by one means or another – of indigenous peoples.8 This logic is apparent in archetypal settler narratives like James Fenimore Cooper’s The Last of the Mohicans (1826), a historical novel whose very title blends the melancholia and triumph that demarcate settlers’ affective responses to the supposed inevitability of indigenous extinction. Concepts like ‘stadial development’–by which societies progress through stages, progressively eliminating earlier social forms–and ‘fatal impact’–which names the biological inevitability of strong peoples supplanting weak–all contribute to the notion that settler colonialism is a kind of ‘ecological process’9 that necessitates the extinction of inferior races. What is surprising, though, is how often the trope of extinctional so appears with reference to settlers themselves; it makes sense for settlers to narrate how their presence entails others’ destruction, but it is less clear why their attempts to imagine futures should presume extinction to be their own logical end as well. The idea appears repeatedly in English-language literary treatments of settler colonial-ism. Consider, for instance, the following rumination on the future of South African settler society, from Olive Schreiner’s 1883Story of an African Farm: It was one of them, one of those wild old Bushmen, that painted those pictures there. He did not know why he painted but he wanted to make something, so he made these. [...] Now the Boers have shot them all, so that we never see a yellow face peeping out among the stones.[...] And the wild bucks have gone, and those days, and we are here. But we will be gone soon, and only the stones will lie on, looking at everything like they look now.10 In this example, the narrating settler character, Waldo, recognizes prior indigenous inhabitation but his knowledge comes freighted with an expected sense of biological superiority, made apparent by his description of the ‘Bushman’s’ ‘yellow face’, and lack of mental self-awareness. What is not clear is why Waldo’s contemplation of colonial genocide should turn immediately to the assumption that a similar fate awaits his people as well. A similar presumption of racial vulnerability permeates other late nineteenth-century novels from the imperial metropole, such as Dracula and War of the Worlds which are plotted around the prospect of invasions that would see the extinction of British imperialism, and, in the process, the human species. Such anxieties draw energy from a pattern of settler defensiveness that can be observed across numerous settler-colonial contexts. Marilyn Lake’s and Henry Reynold’s account of the emergence of transnational ‘whiteness’ highlights the paradoxical fact that while white male settlers have been arguably the most privileged class in history, they have routinely perceived themselves to be ‘under siege’, threatened with destruction to the extent that their very identity of ‘whiteness was born in the apprehension of imminent loss’.11 The fear of looming annihilation serves a powerful ideological function in settler communities, working to foster racial solidarity, suppress dissent, and legitimate violence against indigenous populations who, by any objective measure, are far more at risk of extermination than the settlers who fear them. Ann Curthoys and Dirk Moseshave traced this pattern in Australia and Israel-Palestine, respectively.12 This scholarship suggests that narratives of settler extinction are acts of ideological mystification, obscuring the brutal inequalities of the frontier behind a mask of white vulnerability–an argument with which I sympathize. However, this article shows how there is more to settler-colonial extinction narratives than bad faith. I argue that we need a more nuanced understanding of how they encode a specifically settler-colonial framework for imagining the future, one that has implications for how we understand contemporary literatures from settler societies, and which allows us to see extinction as a genuine, if flawed, attempt to envisage social change.

#### Vote neg to reject logics of self-preservation that make decolonization unthinkable

Dalley 16

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I argue that we need a more nuanced understanding of how they encode a specifically settler-colonial framework for imagining the future, one that has implications for how we understand contemporary literatures from settler societies, and which allows us to see extinction as a genuine, if flawed, attempt to envisage social change. In the remainder of this paper **I consider extinction’s function as a metaphor of decolonization**. I use this phrase **to invoke**, without completely endorsing, Tuck and Yang’s argument that to treat **decolonization figuratively, as I argue extinction narratives do**, is necessarily **to preclude radical change, creating** opportunities for settler **‘moves to innocence’ that re-legitimate racial inequality**.13 The counterview to this pessimistic perspec tive is offered by **Veracini**, who **suggests that progressive change to settler-colonial relationships will only happen if narratives can** be found that **make decolonization think- able**.14 This article enters the debate between these two perspectives by asking what it means for settler writers to imagine the future via the trope of extinction. Does extinction offer a meaningful way to think about ending settler colonialism, or does it re-activate settler-colonial patterns of thought that allow exclusionary social structures to persist? I explore this question with reference to examples of contemporary literary treatments of extinction from select English-speaking settler-colonial contexts: South Africa, Australia, and Canada.15 The next section of this article traces key elements of extinction narrative in a range of settler-colonial texts, while the section that follows offers a detailed reading of one of the best examples of a sustained literary exploration of human finitude, Margaret Atwood’s Maddaddam trilogy (2003–2013). I advance four specific arguments. First, extinc- tion narratives take at least two forms depending on whether the ‘end’ of settler society is framed primarily in historical-civilizational terms or in a stronger, biological sense; the key question is whether the ‘thing’ that is going extinct is a society or a species. Second, bio- logically oriented extinction narratives rely on a more or less conscious slippage between ‘the settler’ and ‘the human’. Third, this slippage is ideologically ambivalent: on the one hand, it contains a radical charge that invokes environmentalist discourse and climate-change anxiety to imagine social forms that re-write settler-colonial dynamics; on the other, it replicates a core aspect of imperialist ideology by normalizing whiteness as equivalent to humanity. Fourth, these ideological effects are mediated by gender, insofar as extinction narratives invoke issues of biological reproduction, community protection, and violence that function to differentiate and reify masculine and feminine roles in the puta- tive de-colonial future. Overall, my central claim is that **extinction is a** core **trope through which settler futurity emerges**, one with crucial narrative and ideological effects that shape much of the contemporary literature emerging from white colonial settings. Settler-colonial extinction narratives take two broad forms, depending on whether the end they depict is framed in historical-civilizational or biological terms (though the two overlap). The latter type is my primary focus in this article, but I will first briefly consider the former to provide contrast for the biologically inflected narrative. Historical-civiliza- tional visions of the end of settler colonialism invoke classical notions of the rise and fall of societies, plotting the white world’s development within a cyclical temporality that makes inevitable its eventual demise. Such narratives challenge the faith in progress found in stadial theories of development (such as those promulgated by Scottish Enlight- enment figures like Adam Ferguson16) and draw instead on parallels between the fate of modern and classical empires. Gibbon’s History of the Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire becomes a model not only of the past, but also the future. The passage from Schreiner’s African Farm cited above belongs within this tradition, offering a vision of an empty, in different land (‘the stones will lie on’) populated by waves of humans (the ‘yellow face[d]’ Bushmen; the Boers; the English), each of which gives way to the other until a future in which none are left. J.M. Coetzee’s Waiting for the Barbarians (1980), published at the height of the struggle against white domination in South Africa, makes this narrative even more explicit. With a title drawn from the neo-classicist poet C.P. Cafavy that invokes the late-Roman parallel,17 Coetzee allegorizes apartheid South Africa as ‘the Empire’, a dying institution that can neither protect its own borders from ‘barbarian’ encroachment nor maintain the veneer of ideological consistency that would justify its violence. As the novel’s protagonist, the Magistrate, contemplates his society’s demise, he comes to realise how the problem of ends is intrinsic to the temporality of settler colonialism: What has made it impossible for us to live in time like fish in water, like birds in air, like chil- dren? It is the fault of Empire! Empire has created the time of history. Empire has located its existence not in the smooth recurrent spinning time of the cycle of the seasons but in the jagged time of rise and fall, of beginning and end, of catastrophe. Empire dooms itself to live in history and plot against history. One thought alone preoccupies the submerged mind of Empire: how not to end, how not to die, how to prolong its era.18 Within this temporality, the future can be glimpsed in the past, as a repetition of previous cycles of destruction and supersession, more or less deferred. The Magistrate thus finds evidence for his fate in archaeology, when he uncovers remnants of a lost civilization that both predates his own and portends its future: ‘Perhaps ten feet below the floor lie the ruins of another fort, razed by the barbarians, peopled with the bones of folk who thought they would find safety behind high walls.’19 As this example implies, historical-civilizational extinction narratives express ambiva- lence about endings that emerges from their affective register. **Extinction becomes** a fate to be **contemplated with fear**, but also resignation; **because the future is** a recapitula- tion of **the past**, the tone is elegiac rather than apocalyptic, and death becomes a matter of nostalgia more than terror. In Nadine Gordimer’s July’s People (1981), the white family that flees the collapse of apartheid understands its journey into black-dominated rural South Africa as a repeat of the interminable pattern of African history: they follow one of ‘hun- dreds of tracks used since ancient migrations (never ended; her family’s was the latest)’.20 This return to primordial nomadism thrusts Gordimer’s characters into circum- stances of material and agential deprivation, returning them to a condition preceding their accession to racial privilege. They must give up not only the physical comforts accorded by apartheid, but also the capacity to make meaningful decisions about their fate – decisions now made by their erstwhile black servant-turned-protector. This inversion allows the white protagonist Maureen to approach an understanding of how apartheid might have been experienced by its victims; she achieves some insight when she realizes that the historical rupture means she is no longer ‘in possession of any part of her life’.21 From this point of view, the overthrow of settler colonialism becomes an opportunity for settlers’ moral regeneration and subjective transformation. Since history is cyclical, the guilt and inauthenticity generated by settler colonialism becomes incidental to whiteness – once the structures that enshrined his or her control are destroyed, the settler is liberated into a no longer ethically compromised identity. Thus even as Coetzee’s Magistrate finds it ‘as hard as ever to believe that the end is near’,22 he also relishes with ‘elation’ the idea that, were he no longer part of the apparatus of empire, he would be a ‘free man’ who had attained ‘salvation’.23 Historical-civilizational **narratives of extinction** thereby literally **enact** what Tuck and Yang call **a ‘move to innocence’**. By looking beyond the end of settler colonialism, **they imagine futures** in **which ‘settler guilt** and complicity’ **will be washed away**, and **the settler** him- or herself **will metamorphose into** **a liberated subject**ivity.24Many settler-colonial narratives operate purely within this historical-civilizational regis- ter. However, extinction becomes truly interesting when the metaphor’s biological impli- cations are unlocked. Hints of this can be found in Waiting for the Barbarians. While the Magistrate sees the overthrow of empire as an inevitable expression of the cyclical nature of history, he also finds society’s fate written in local ecology. The ‘barbarians’ are materially impoverished but live lightly on the land; the settlers’ wealth, by contrast, is predicated on an agriculture that is unsustainable in the long term: Every year the lake-water becomes a little more salty. [...] The barbarians know this fact. At this very moment they are saying to themselves, ‘Be patient, one of these days their crops will start withering from the salt, they will not be able to feed themselves, they will have to go.’ That is what they are thinking. That they will outlast us.25 Thus the historical-civilizational pattern of rise and fall – which amounts to a theory of world history that explains and to some extent exonerates settler colonialism – is reinforced by an environmental narrative of decay. The settlers will lose, eventually, because their mode of production is at odds with nature: a fact that violence can delay but never alter. An even more explicit example of such thinking can be found in Alex Miller’s Journey to the Stone Country (2002), a novel that explores the fate of settler colonialism in contemporary Australia. The story begins when the protagonist, Annabelle, is left by her husband and returns from Melbourne to her place of birth, near Townsville in Northern Queensland. Unlike the cosmopolitan metropolis, here Annabelle finds Australia’s settler-colonial dynamics intrusively apparent: ‘Here the past could not be ignored, was not covered over and obscured by the accretions of city life, but was laid bare, the open wounds still visible.’26 The land itself reveals these signs, marks made by the Indigenous Australians who are ‘a scattered population [that] had been dispersed and murdered long ago’.27 **That visibility forces Annabelle to confront her identity as a settler, one whose existence is predicted on dispossession and for whom it would therefore be legitimate ‘to be hated [... f]or what we’ve stolen from them’.28** In **confront**ing **the truth of** frontier **genocide**, Annabelle has **to** consider the possibility of an **end to settler dominion**, for she has arrived at a moment when the Indigenous population is resurgent. The change in power relations is represented through a struggle for control of Ranna Station, a pastoral estate owned for five generations by the Biggs family – archetypal colonial settlers committed to the idea of themselves as builders of white civilization – but which has recently been bought by a consortium of Aboriginal groups. In other words, Annabelle is witnessing a historical reversal, the moment at which settler power is broken and control of the land reverts to its Indigenous inhabitants. Miller frames this ‘unimaginable revolution’ in ‘the great wheel of history’29 within the language of biological extinction, inverting its typical application to a presumed Aboriginal past by making it a prophecy of the settlers’ future. Thus Bo Rennie, an Aboriginal surveyor who becomes Annabelle’s lover, gleefully repurposes the language of settler triumph to describe the Biggs clan as having ‘died out’ – ‘Them Biggs turned out to be a vanishing race’, he observes on several occasions.30 The Aboriginal leader Les Marra is even more ambitious. His plan is to dam the valley and flood Ranna Station, obliterating all traces of settler presence and, in so doing, creating an exploitable water resource to fund future projects of Aboriginal enhancement. Marra’s goal is a ‘thousand year plan’ of anti- colonial resistance predicated on the belief that all Aboriginal people have to do to defeat the settlers is to wait for them to die out: This story’s not over yet. The old people not finished yet! That Les Marra and my Arner here, they gonna fight this war for another thousand years. Where’s the white feller gonna be in a thousand years? He’s the one gotta worry about that, not us. We still gonna be here.31 The thousand-year plan (with its ironic invocation of Hitler’s millennium of Aryan supremacy) frames settler colonialism within the radically extended temporality of ecological survival. From this perspective, the material aspects of settler domination are of little importance when compared to the enduring nature of biological life – to which Aboriginal people, by virtue of their 50,000 plus years of residence in Australia, are presumed to be better adapted. **This ‘biological’ view of** inevitable white **extinction forces Annabelle to confront**, for the first time, **the full implications of the end of settler colonialism**: She knew, with a little shock of dismay, with a feeling of personal affront, that Les Marra’s vision of the future would never be reconciled to her existence or to the decency of her own past, the lives of her parents and grandparents. Her existence, indeed, was of no conse- quence to him. There could be no place for her, or for her kind, in the victory he envisaged. Secretly she hoped Les Marra’s crusade would fail, but she knew it would not fail. For Les Marra had only to persist. He had forever. There was no time limit to his strategy.32 The trope of **extinction** thereby **challenges the** liberal **belief in ‘reconciliation’ as a way out of the structural conflict between settlers and Aborigines**.33 Annabelle is in many ways a model settler: she is normatively antiracist, respectful of Aboriginal ways, and self-aware about how she has benefitted from colonialism. But the biological connotations of extinction render such moral-affective qualities irrelevant. The narrative Miller sets in motion frames settler colonialism as an unequal social relationship taking place over the longue durée, within a material, ecologically defined context. From this point of view, individual settlers’ desires and beliefs mean nothing; what matters is that settler colonialism is doomed to fail because it is not attuned to nature. This shift to the extended temporalities of biology/ecology can be seen also in Coetzee’s more recent engagement with the end of apartheid. Disgrace (1999), like Journey to the Stone Country, focuses on a cross-racial exchange of property rights and power. The white protagonist David Lurie’s daughter, Lucy, is a small-scale farmer in the Eastern Cape Province. Post-apartheid changes to agricultural laws allow her former employee, Petrus, to take possession of a slice of ‘her’ land, and the novel charts the progressive shift in power between them – with the collapse of white dominance marked violently when Lucy is raped by three black strangers. By the end of the novel, settler colonialism is locally finished; Lucy’s only hope for survival is to subordinate herself to the patriarchal order of Petrus’ household, accepting his authority in exchange for protection. As with the earlier examples, Lucy sees this move as redemptive, a way of making amends for apartheid and thereby opening the possibility that she might be able to persist into an altered, decolonized future: I agree it is humiliating. But perhaps that is a good point to start from again. Perhaps that is what I must learn to accept. To start at ground level. With nothing. Not with nothing but. With nothing. No cards, no weapons, no property, no rights.34 Yet when Lurie contemplates the fact of her pregnancy he recasts this transformation in biological terms, making it an end rather than the ‘start’ of anything new, foreclosing any hope for redemption: So: once she was only a little tadpole in her mother’s body, and now here she is, solid in her existence, more solid than he has ever been. With luck she will last a long time, long beyond him. When he is dead she will, with luck, still be here doing her ordinary tasks among the flow- erbeds. And from within her will have issued another existence, that with luck will be just as solid, just as long-lasting. So it will go on, a line of existences in which his share, his gift, will grow inexorably less and less, till it may as well be forgotten.35 The unspoken racial undertone – for Lucy’s pregnancy is a result of her rape – turns this passage into a consideration of the death of settler society. Lurie’s ‘share’ or ‘gift’ is not only his familial or cultural contribution to his grandchild, but also his genetic legacy. What will fade over generations is whiteness itself, that politically privileged phenotype that, with the death of colonialism, now has no future but to dissipate in a sea of black genes. Petrus, like Les Marra, ‘has a vision of the future in which people like Lucy have no place’,36 and the novel offers no reason to believe he is wrong. She may linger for a generation, but the end of whiteness is unavoidable; biology guarantees it; all that is needed is time. The ‘line of existences’ in Disgrace thus parallels the ‘thousand year plan’ of Journey to the Stone Country in suggesting the inevitability of white extinction and the irrelevance of white hopes for redemption. Both novels differ from white supremacist paranoia37 in approaching the end elegiacally; the death of settler colonialism is, from this perspective, desirable, even if the some of the losses it entails are regrettable. The former example, however, reveals what was only implicit in the latter: the extent to which this extinction narrative is gendered. Lurie’s vision of his own ‘gift’ fading away contains an implicitly patriarchal subtext. As much as he recognizes his daughter’s ‘solid [...] existence’, his reverie transforms her into a conduit for racial identities that are implicitly masculine. Lucy’s body becomes the passive medium through which white and black men struggle for biological dominance. This theme is reinforced by Disgrace’s parallel plotline, which features Lurie sexually abusing a young ‘coloured’ student of his – a crime that he later recognizes is wrong not only ethically but also biologically, for ‘If the old men hog the young women, what will be the future of the species?’38 The biologically inflected extinc- tion narrative thus brings with it normative conceptions of masculine and feminine iden- tity derived from supposedly innate reproductive roles, in which women are implicitly marked as lacking agency or significance except as repositories for (white or black) sperm. Women are asked to subordinate themselves to the task of transitioning out of settler colonialism, and are invited to acquiesce to a patriarchal order newly re-legitimated by the biological imperatives of racial revolution. The examples analysed to this point have been drawn from two Anglophone settler colo- nies – South Africa and Australia. To take this further I now turn to a third settler society, likewise a former part of the British Empire: Canada. This section explores how the themes laid out above shape Margaret Atwood’s Maddaddam trilogy (2003–2013), one of the most sustained and interesting contemporary instances of extinction literature. Atwood’s novels, Oryx and Crake (2003), Year of the Flood (2009) and Maddaddam (2013) differ from the texts above in making the biological/ecological dimensions of extinction central and literal. What Atwood depicts is not a metaphorical prospect (races are not species and so cannot go extinct per se) but rather a post-apocalyptic future in which humanity as a whole teeters on the brink of actual oblivion. These texts have typically been read less in terms of postcolonial theory than as a contribution to the emergent sub- genre of ‘climate change fiction’ or CliFi, for which the issue of ‘species survival’ is of press- ing concern.39 I argue that Atwood’s trilogy can be read interestingly when its eco-critical and settler-colonial concerns are seen as intertwined. I suggest that as much as she is intent to explore the environmental consequences of climate change, biotechnology, and capitalist authoritarianism, Atwood is also seeking to imagine a future beyond settler colonialism – and that in so doing, she sheds light on the ideological tensions of extinction as outlined thus far. The opening novel of the trilogy, Oryx and Crake, offers a vision of a post-apocalyptic world that repeats, uncannily, imperial fantasies of settlement. The protagonist, alter- nately named Jimmy and Snowman to signify his pre- and post-apocalypse identities, witnesses ‘the end of a species’40 when a genetically engineered virus wipes out human- ity, leaving him (he believes) the last person alive. In describing his position, Atwood invokes the figure of the archetypal lone settler, Robinson Crusoe. Like Crusoe, Snowman sees himself as ‘a castaway’, forced to improvise a home in an environment stripped of technological and social support.41 The position is analogous, in Snowman’s view, to that of ‘European colonials running plantations of one kind or another’, in that he and they are faced with the challenge of maintaining ‘sanity’ in a lonely and clima- tically alienating environment.42 The role of ‘native’ within this metaphor is filled by the ‘Crakers’, a bioengineered species designed by Jimmy’s old friend Crake as a superior replacement for the humans he exterminates. Snowman explicitly likens the Crakers to ‘indigenous peoples’43 and, in keeping with imperial stereotypes of the native as cul- tureless yet attuned with nature (an idea partly invoked by Journey to the Stone Country), the Crakers’ capacity for survival lies in their biological conformity to environmental demands: They were perfectly adjusted to their habitat, so they would never need to create houses or tools or weapons, or, for that matter, clothing. They would have no need to invent any harmful symbolisms, such as kingdoms, icons, gods, or money.44 Oryx and Crake thereby stages extinction as an inversion and reversal of the settler-colonial myth of origins. Instead of the settler penetrating, disrupting and eventually supplanting indigenous society, here Snowman’s role is to witness the breakdown of industrial coloni- alism and its replacement with a more idyllic, ‘natural’ (yet bioengineered) mode of being. This inversion alters the flow of racialized time, so that whiteness no longer represents the future towards which humanity progresses but an anachronistic throwback that has already been transcended. As Snowman acknowledges, ‘I’m your past [...]. I’m your ances- tor, come from the land of the dead. Now I’m lost, I can’t get back, I’m stranded here, I’m all alone.’45 Jimmy chooses his new name to reflect his status as the last, vulnerable represen- tative of a dying species: Maybe he’s not the Abominable Snowman at all. Maybe he’s the other kind of snowman, the grinning dope set up as a joke and pushed down as entertainment, his pebble smile and carrot nose an invitation to mockery and abuse. Maybe that’s the real him, the last Homo sapiens – a white illusion of a man, here today, gone tomorrow, so easily shoved over, left to melt in the sun, getting thinner and thinner until he liquefies and trickles away altogether.46 In this way, Atwood shapes her climate-change narrative according to the ‘palindrome’ structure that Veracini identifies in the archetypal settlement myth.47 Instead of centring on a moment of colonial irruption from which the future unfolds as a recapitulation of the metropolitan past, Atwood’s version makes the moment of decolonization its pivot; her future is a landscape stripped of the settler (the ‘white illusion of a man’) and restored to beings who metaphorically, if not literally, arise from the precolonial imaginary. As the last settler, Snowman’s role is not to dominate or destroy the Crakers, but to protect them. In fact, one of the climactic moments of the novel occurs when he adopts the classical settler-colonial role of Moses,48 and leads his charges from the labora- tory in which they were created to the relative safety of empty territory. The end of settler colonialism thus constitutes the allegorical tenor of a tale of the end of humanity: the death of the species affords the opportunity for white supremacy to be overturned in a process that repeats, and thereby undoes, the founding myths of settlement. This allegorical structure has important consequences for how human subjectivity is constituted vis-à-vis extinction. Dipesh Chakrabarty has argued that the emergence of climate change into public awareness alters our ‘historical sensibility’, collapsing the key enlightenment distinction between history and natural science and requiring us to imagine our place in time not via modern categories like class, nation or individual, but through the sublime figure of ‘species’. This latter concept radically extends the temporal scope of meaningful action, and it brings to attention those biological ‘conditions for the existence of life in the human form that have no intrinsic connection to the logics of capi- talist, nationalist, or socialist identities’ – that have, in other words, no significance for his- torical narratives as traditionally composed.49 From this point of view, Atwood’s account of the end of humanity – with its detailed exploration of how the biosphere alters to accom- modate the sudden elimination of its top predator – could be read as a radical attempt to conceive of an Anthropocene post-history. Yet the allegorical equation of biological extinction with the end of settler colonialism has the paradoxical effect of undoing much of that radical charge. For what the allegory does is equate, however tentatively, ‘the human’ – which for Chakrabarty is both ‘a purposeful biological entity’ and a blind ‘geophysical force’ that transcends identity categories50 – with the white settler subject: the master agent of the imperialist narrative of world history. Far from unsettling coloni- alism, Atwood’s narrative sees imperialist ideology re-emerge in the moment of its nega- tion. In attempting to narrate the end of settler colonialism, Oryx and Crake actually restates one of its core premises: that the white settler is the archetypal human. Whiteness is re-normalized as the ground against which human experience is measured, and the mul- tiple ways of being human are erased through a discursive manoeuvre that is just as effec- tive as Crake’s act of biological spring cleaning. This is not the only mechanism through which Atwood’s story invokes, only to subvert, the possibility of an end to settler colonialism. A key theme of her trilogy concerns the role of language in tracking the decline of settler/industrial civilization. Following the tradition of George Orwell, Atwood depicts a future in which language has been co-opted by pol- itical and corporate elites; commercial euphemism blunts the critical capacity of words, making it impossible to imagine, let alone resist, economic and scientific decisions that are destroying the environment. Jimmy charts this decline by compiling lists of ‘old words’, ‘words of a precision and suggestiveness that no longer had a meaningful appli- cation in today’s world’.51 In their place has arisen a jargon of commercial neologism that obfuscates the brutal power dynamics of this authoritarian society. For instance, the private security company that monopolizes violence is called ‘CorpSeCorp’, a name that invokes and obfuscates its triple status as a corporation, a paramilitary corps, and a commercial manufacturer of corpses. In defiance of such language, Jimmy makes a point of reading old books, acting out the quixotic belief that if the ‘the decision- making levels of society’ consider something to be ‘arcane lore’ then he will preserve it, delaying the inevitable by turning the pursuit of ‘the superfluous [into] an end in itself’.52 Jimmy/Snowman thus becomes the precarious repository of a literary culture neg- lected by his civilization, trying to hold onto a language that ‘had lost its solidity’ and ‘become thin, contingent, slippery, a viscid film on which he was sliding around like an eyeball on a plate’.53 From this point of view, Snowman’s impending demise signifies not only the extinction of a species but also the point beyond which the accumulated knowledge of the Anglo- phone world will be lost forever – an idea also found in other extinction narratives. In Journey to the Stone Country, for instance, the association between biological and cultural extinction is represented symbolically. Annabelle discovers an old library in the Biggs homestead, but when she tries to read the books – which include canonical titles by the likes of Thomas Carlyle, thus amounting to a synecdoche for Western civilization – she finds they have been turned to unreadable paste by termites.54 Similarly, in Waiting for the Barbarians the Magistrate is prompted to contemplate his own finitude by his discov- ery that the records of the past Empire he discovers are indecipherable – as his own writing will, he recognizes, inevitably become.55 Extinction thus avows that settler/indus- trial society will be expunged not only from the future, but also the past: with the language of empire forgotten, it will be as though it never happened. As Crake observes, ‘All it takes [...] is the elimination of one generation. One generation of anything. Beetles, trees, microbes, scientists, speakers of French, whatever. Break the link in time between one gen- eration and the next, and it’s game over forever.’56 Radical finitude marks the boundary of the futurist imagination, for, beyond it, the language in which speculation is couched dis- appears, leaving a silence that makes all history meaningless. Yet this emphasis on the role of language produces an irony that again renders extinc- tion ambivalent. The irony is apparent in the passage cited above, in which Jimmy expresses his feeling that language has ‘lost its solidity’. His ‘eyeball’ metaphor is paradoxical insofar as its form belies its apparent content; notwithstanding their supposed inadequacy, Jimmy’s actual words are precise enough to conjure a powerfully concrete and de-familiarising simile that conjoins an abstract conceptualization of words’ inadequacy to the concrete reg- ister of sensory affect (‘viscid film’; ‘an eyeball on a plate’). Atwood’s diagnosis of linguistic collapse thus occurs in a passage that auto-deconstructs, making an assertion (language has lost its expressive capacity) that is belied by rhetorical form (an expressive and highly affecting metaphor). The effect is like a ‘blow to the head’, to use Kafka’s famous description of literature that shakes us from the banality of reified language. This is but one example of the broader irony of Atwood’s project – to explore, through literary fiction, the environ- mental and civilizational consequences of an instrumental modernity that renders litera- ture, and the humanistic values it is presumed to embody, putatively obsolete. That irony signals the point at which Atwood’s trilogy (in keeping with the settler-colo- nial extinction narrative broadly) retreats from its contemplation of finitude. Oryx and Crake’s account of the eclipse of literary culture is matched by its concern with the process of storytelling itself. Crake believed that his post-human species would be biologi- cally self-sufficient, but it soon becomes apparent that they require education as much as their superseded precursors. Thus Snowman takes on the role of catechist, transmuting his knowledge of the human past into a plausible yet palatable story for the Crakers. That story is explicitly reshaped to fit the conventions of myth, eventually amounting to a mythological/religious creation narrative: Crake make the bones of the Children of Crake out of the coral on the beach, and then he made their flesh out of a mango. But the Children of Oryx hatched out of an egg, a giant egg laid by Oryx herself. Actually she laid two eggs: one full of animals and birds and fish, and the other full of words. But the egg full of words hatched first, and the Children of Crake had already been created by then, and they’d eaten up all the words because they were hungry, and so there were no words left over when the second egg hatched out. And that is why the animals can’t talk.57 In this way the end of white/human civilization is averted by its transmutation into a differ- ent narrative register: aspects of the past persist insofar as they can be accommodated within fable. What is lost is what would make the narrative ‘realistic’ – Crake’s megalomania and the contempt for society that leads him to erase rather than reform it – but that is a low price to pay when the reward is the preservation of a culture that had seemed close to slipping away. Indeed, Snowman’s role as storyteller marks the introduction of a new discursive frame- work for the extinction narrative – that of religion, specifically the Judeo-Christian master- narrative of sin and redemption. Religious themes are relatively muted in Oryx and Crake, appearing largely as an ironic allegorical structure against which the horrors of biological annihilation stand out starkly. (For instance, Crake’s bioengineered genocide, which leaves the earth piled with the rotting flesh of its victims, is described by Snowman as ‘The Great Rearrangement’ – a redemptive, loving act in which the god-Crake washes away the sins of ‘the chaos’ to make room for his morally pure post-human favourites.58) The new discur- sive framework becomes the dominant concern of the trilogy’s second novel, The Year of the Flood. This novel adopts the same doubled chronological structure as Oryx and Crake. It traces simultaneously the experiences of two survivors of the pandemic and, through flashbacks, their earlier lives as members of ‘God’s Gardeners’, an apocalyptic cult blending environ- mental anxieties with an anticipation of the end of times drawn from Christian eschatology: A massive die-off of the human race was impending, due to over-population and wickedness, but the Gardeners exempted themselves: they intended to float above the Waterless Flood, with the aid of the food they were stashing away in the hidden storeplaces they called Ararats. As for the flotation devices in which they would ride out this flood, they themselves would be their own Arks, stored with their own collections of inner animals, or at least the names of those animals. Thus they would survive to replenish the Earth.59 As James Belich has pointed out, the biblical phrase cited in the final sentence (Genesis 9:1) belongs to a long tradition of religious justification for settler colonialism, in which the Old Testament in particular becomes a blueprint for the conquest and occupation of ‘empty’ lands.60 In the context of the Maddaddam trilogy, it marks the point at which Atwood retreats from the prospect of a complete end implied by Snowman’s putative status as the final human/settler. Instead, the trilogy becomes increasingly concerned with how humanity can be saved from annihilation. Faith in a divine power is central to that hope. Adam One, the founder of God’s Gardeners, asserts that the ‘strictly materialist view – that we’re an experiment animal protein has been doing on itself – is far too harsh and lonely for most, and leads to nihilism’61 – which is exactly the case for Crake, who strives but fails to eliminate religious consciousness from his created species. Instead, Adam One asserts, ‘we need to push popular sentiment in a biosphere-friendly direction by pointing out the hazards of annoying God by a violation of His trust in our steward- ship’.62 The religious framework introduces a moral distinction between the virtuous and the sinful – a distinction that cannot be applied to the concept of ‘species’, as Chak- rabarty’s argument implies.63 Surviving extinction becomes a privilege accorded to the morally upright few, who are rewarded not only with life, but with dominion over the now-emptied world. A story that started as a biologically inflected account of the end of settler-colonial/industrial society has become, via the introduction of redemption, an account of how some people earn divine title to territory: a settler-colonial narrative par excellence. his transformation of the narrative of endings into its opposite is complete by the tril- ogy’s third novel. Maddaddam takes up where Oryx and Crake and Year of the Flood finish, recounting how a band of survivors comes together to forge a new community in the ruins of the old. In keeping with the retreat from species consciousness, this narrative centres on a core moral distinction: between a decent, peace-minded community made up of good humans, Crakers, and ‘pigoons’ (genetically modified, hyper-intelligent pigs), on the one hand, and a predatory group of ‘Painballers’ (traumatized ex-convicts embodying hyper- masculine aggression), on the other. Thus the human attributes that led to environmental collapse – greed, violence, self-centredness – are abjected onto a marginal subcategory of humans, who are eliminated via extra-judicial execution in the novel’s climax. The alleg- edly peace-loving, inter-species community of survivors that is founded through that abjection is a perfect instantiation of the settler-colonial fantasy: a walled compound in the wilderness, defended by military force, subsisting via agriculture. To reinforce the solidity of that community, Maddaddam enacts a hybridization of humans and post- humans that recapitulates the classical settler desire to merge with indigenous popu- lations. That union is first and foremost genetic: three of the human survivors are impreg- nated by Crakers, giving birth to biologically ambiguous children who are, in the words of a male survivor who helps raise them, ‘the future of the human race’.64 Thus Atwood employs a standard trope of settler-colonial ideology, making sex between colonists and natives the mechanism through which to resolve the paradox of settlement and create a future race with the power of whiteness and the belonging of indigeneity.65 That such a mechanism of escape is gendered goes without saying, for it is on the human women that the risk of cross-species reproduction falls. At the same time, however, Atwood’s hybridization is also cultural. Toby, one of the human survivors, succeeds in teaching a Craker child to read and write, enabling the transmission of historical knowledge to the next generation. Maddaddam’s final chapter presents the novel itself as the product of this cultural transmission, linking the post- apocalyptic future to the past via the mechanism that, for Coetzee and Miller, also signifies the core strength of settler-colonial civilization – literacy: Toby gave warnings about this Book that we wrote. She said that the paper must not get wet, or the Words would melt away and would be heard no longer, and mildew would grow on it, and it would turn black and crumble to nothing. And that another Book should be made, with the same writing as the first one. And each time a person came into the knowledge of the writing, and the paper, and the pen, and the ink, and the reading, that one also was to make the same Book, with the same writing in it. So it would always be there for us to read.66 The death of language that Snowman saw as the ending of humanity – its erasure not only from the future, but also the past – is averted. History is transmuted into scripture, and the species/race is preserved as redemption is interpolated into the narrative of extinction. In this way, these settler-colonial **narratives of extinction begin as** a contemplation of endings and end as **a way for settlers to persist**. As in the classical solution to the settler-colonial paradox of origins, **the native** **must be** invoked and **disavowed, and** ultimately absorbed **into the settler-colonial body as a means of accessing** true belonging and **the possibility of an authentic future** in place. **Veracini**’s description of the settler- colonial historical imagination **thus applies**, in modified but no less appropriate form, **to visions of futurity haunted by the possibility of death: Settler colonial themes include** the perception of **an impending catastrophe that prompts permanent displacement**, the tension between tradition and adaptation and between sedentar- ism and nomadism, the transformative permanent shift to a new locale, the prospect of a safe ‘new land’, and the familial reproductive unit that moves as one and finally settles an arcadia that is conveniently empty.67 And yet that parallel means that it is not entirely true to say that settlers cannot contemplate a future without themselves, or that they lack the metaphorical resources to imagine their own demise. It is in fact characteristic of settler consciousness to continually imagine the end. But it does so through a paradox that echoes the ambivalence of Freud’s death drive: **it is a fantasy of extinction that** tips over into its opposite and **becomes a method of symbolic preservation**, a technique for delaying the end, **for living on in** the contemplation of **death**.68 The settler desire for death conceals that wish – **the hope that**, between the thought of the end and the act, someone will intervene, something will happen to show that it is not really necessary, that the **settlers can stay, that they have value and can go on living**. In this way, **they make their own redemption**, an extinction that is **an act of self-preservation**, deferring the hard reckoning we know we lack the courage to face, **and avoid making the real changes – material, political, constitutional, practical** – that might alter our condition of being and set us on the path to a real home in the world. We dream instead of ends, imagining worlds without us, thinking of what it would be like not to be. But at every moment we know that that the dream is nothing but a dream; we know we will awake and still be here, unchanged, unchanging, living on, forever. Thus settlers persist even beyond the moment of extinction they thought they wanted to arrive.

### Case

#### Vote neg on Presumption - they don't have a single card that tech platforms matter at all to Russia. The 1AC lynn evidence is tagged to say platform monopolies allow russian intervention - but the text of the card doesn't even contain the word Russia!!! It talks generally about misinformation – which ironically proves that this card is misinformation lol

#### Fear of Russian conflict is rooted in a racist and exceptionalist mythology that necessitates the construction of threats to justify militarism---this straight-turns the case---their claims are false peddlings of neo-cons, but their framing makes them real through spiraling antagonism

Roberts 16 – Dr. Kari Roberts, PhD, Associate Professor of Political Science in the Department of Economics, Justice, and Policy Studies at Mount Royal University, Senior Fellow at the Canadian International Council, “Why a Normal Relationship With Russia Is So Hard: Russophobia in Clinton-era American Foreign Policy Discourse and The Decision to Expand NATO”, Prepared for presentation at the Canadian Political Science Association (CPSA) Annual Conference, 5-17, https://cpsa-acsp.ca/documents/conference/2016/Roberts.pdf

Conceptualizing Russophobia

As Time magazine’s person of the year in 2007, Vladimir Putin took the opportunity to publicly address the negative views of Russia that exist in the West, accusing “some” Americans of perpetuating false view of Russians as “a little bit savage still or they just climbed down from the trees, you know, and probably need to have their hair brushed or their beards trimmed. And have the dirt washed out of their beards and hair. That’s the civilizing mission to be accomplished.”14 Though Putin’s characterization may be somewhat extreme, Russophobia is well documented in Russia, with politicians and analysts giving voice to this phenomenon and its influences on policy makers. However, much less has been written on Russophobia in English, and for Western audiences. But if we ever hope to truly understand the many facets of the Russia-US relationship, we must consider the ways in which attitudes toward Russia may be influencing American decision making.

Western characterizations of Putin are that he is an evil dictator, abusing democracy, human rights and the rule of law, bent upon re-drawing Europe’s map, asserting Russia’s influence and balancing against American power at every turn. This characterization of Russia’s president is reflected in a 2009 Economist article in which Putin was said to be looking for a war with the West, having “tantrums” over controversial disagreements in the Middle East and Georgia, “stumbling” into disputes with the West, and driven by “paranoia” and “encirclement.”15 While some of these criticisms of Putin may not be entirely unreasonable, there is more to such critiques of Putin than simply policy disagreement. An inherent mistrust of Russia and of Russians themselves, has colored western, and especially American, views about post-Soviet Russia dating back to the Yeltsin presidency.

DW Benn, writing about the misunderstanding of Russia in the West, notes the presence of these ideas in the centuries old words of Lord Palmerston himself, who once described a Russian colleague as “’civil and courteous’ but with ‘all the cunning of a half-educated savage.’”16 According to Benn, a special disdain for the Russian people permeates the discourse about Russia, and is easily hidden in the above criticisms about contemporary Russian politics and foreign policy.17 George Kennan once famously wrote that the political personality of the Soviet Union was one that could not tolerate rivals, and was too “insensitive,” “fierce” and “jealous” to share power. The Soviets were absorbed with securing absolute power consistent with an ideology that instructs them to believe that the outside world is hostile and must be resisted.18 One does not have to look very hard to find these same sentiments about contemporary Russian leaders.

Andrei Tsygankov accurately identifies anti-Russianism, or Russophobia, in American decision making, defined as “a fear of Russia’s political system on the grounds that it is incompatible with the interests and values of the West in general and the United States in particular. This fear finds expression in various forms of criticism of Russia that are unbalanced and distorted. No matter which independent actions Moscow may pursue, they are sure to be perceived… as reflecting Russia’s expansionist interests, not as a legitimate pursuit of national interests.” 19 Russophobia transcends ideological and partisan lines, as both neo-conservative and liberal minded groups demonize Russia in fairly equal measure. These attitudes are more than simply a cultural animosity toward Russians; rather, they reflect “a very real fear of Russia’s political influence” that finds expression in a distorted critique of Russia and its politics.20 This animosity results in a persistent need to contain Russia’s influence, even in times of relative peace and cooperation between the two nations. This is evidenced by the impulse to expand NATO just a few short years after the end of the Cold War and before the reversal of early expectations for Russia’s democratic consolidation. This will be discussed later in the paper.

For Tsygankov, Russia is viewed as an expansionist state that refuses to abide by “acceptable rules of international behavior,” owing either to its political culture or its questionable leadership; either way, it must be “contained or fundamentally transformed.”21 Russophobia is informed by a misinterpretation of Russia’s history, one in which Russia has been forced to respond to the actions of the West, rather than represent some sort of ingrained need to conquer and dominate.22 Russia is viewed as an autocratic empire that perpetually oppresses nationalities, denies its citizens basic rights, “concentrates economic and military resources in the hands of the state,” and doggedly pursues its inherent and illegitimate expansionist national interests.23 This last point bears re-stating: Russia is not accorded the courtesy of being seen to possess legitimate national interests, owing to the above assumptions about its nature and motivations. Tsygankov notes that, “even during the 1990s, when Russia looked more like a failing state than one capable of projecting power, some members of the American political class were worried about the future revival of the Eurasian giant as a revisionist power.”24 He attributes the rampant triumphalism in the US at the end of the Cold War to this fear of Russia, noting it reached its zenith in the mid-1990s.25 In fact, it was actually the Clinton administration that “entrenched the rhetoric of victorious thinking by drawing the analogy between Russia and the defeat of Germany and Japan in World War II.”26 This triumphalism implied something inherently superior, and therefore inferior, about the US and Russia, respectively.

Tsygankov is quick to label American Russophobia as a political phenomenon rather than a cultural phenomenon, leaving open the possibility for its willful reversal.27 While it may be the case that Russophobia’s presence in American foreign policy making may not be a fait accompli, its presence in the American discourse may reflect more of a cultural presence of anti-Russianism that is self-reinforcing. In fact, Tsygankov himself notes that public opinion followed elite opinion and policy,28 which testifies to its presence in the popular discourse. Tsygankov claims that the infusion of Russophobia into elite and popular attitudes about Russia is the result of a willful construction of an anti-Russian lobby in order to advance a particular foreign policy agenda. “The Lobby,” is a deliberate cabal of anti-Russian military hawks, or those who presume American geopolitical hegemony can best be achieved by the military defeat of Russia, as well as those who assertively presume the hegemony of so-called liberal values of democracy, rule of law and human rights.29 This Lobby allegedly dates back to the early 20th Century, its views solidified by the Cold War, to which members of Congress and policy makers in the White House have been sympathetic.30 While Tsygankov acknowledges that some of the Lobby’s success could be attributed to the absence of a pro-Russia lobby in the US,31 his attention is trained on the Lobby’s political goal of fostering anti-Russian sentiment in the West in support of a “global power struggle” against a potential “resurgent” Russia, rife with what Zbigniew Brzezinski once labeled “neo-colonial thinkers.”32

Tsygankov seeks to explain the construction and persistence of an anti-Russian lobby that is purposefully distorting Russia’s role in the world, its history and its interests to advance an anti-Russia agenda; however, this is not the precise case made herein. Tsygankov’s premise is not fundamentally rejected here, but it is not fully embraced either. There does seem to be a culture of anti-Russianism present in Washington that has influenced foreign policy elites, but it may not necessarily be the result of an intentional drive to keep Russia down. What this paper shares with Tsygankov is the conviction that Russophobia exists, has a significant influence on American foreign policy concerning Russia, and therefore must be better identified and understood. The goal here is not to reveal malevolence toward Russia, but rather to name this Russophobia, discuss its genesis, and connect it with foreign policy outcomes in the hope of illuminating what remains a significant impediment to a more constructive Russia-US relationship.

In his writing on Russophobia, Anatol Lieven suggests that anti-Russianism is derived in part from the myth of America’s own exceptionalism. This mythology sees the US standing taller than other nations, able to make objective observations about other states’ motives, and thereby construct appropriate policy in response. Lieven warns of the dangers of such assumptions, because they render US policy makers “incapable of understanding the opposition of other nations” to its own policies.33 Lieven takes on NATO expansion directly, noting that, among the many reasons Russia opposes it, is the US’ failure to appreciate what it means for Russia. US policy makers have been genuinely puzzled by Russia’s failure to perceive its enlargement as benign, which is due in part to the American rhetoric that exists alongside the policy decision itself. It is not only the physical expansion of NATO that is problematic, but the corresponding failure to bother understanding Russia’s interests. This unwillingness to understand Russia, combined with the embrace of longstanding and outworn stereotypes about Russia, assumptions about the pattern of history in Russia, as well as a Cold War “hangover” of sorts, which cannot shake the image of Russia-as-threat, all contribute to define Russophobia and the discourse within which American foreign policy is made.

Lieven speculates that the intellectual basis for this Russophobia may stem from 19th Century British propaganda regarding Russian expansionism and its inherent wickedness. Lieven notes that this demonization of other peoples, sometimes taking on a racist tone, has long been present within Western, and American, foreign policy making.34 Moreover, there is a tendency to assume that what was once assumed about a nation and its peoples shall forever be true about them, even in the absence of supporting evidence. This sort of historical determinism denies a nuanced appreciation for cultural evolution and very much denies the potential for American leaders to view post-Soviet Russia’s disappointing struggles with democracy for what they are. Instead, they have been viewed against the backdrop of Russia’s Tsarist and Communist experiences and are therefore “wicked.”35 This is evidenced by Henry Kissinger’s 2000 remark that Russian imperialism has continued for centuries, characterized by subjugation of its neighbours and “overawing those not under its direct control” and in Zbigniew Brzezinski’s assigning of blame for Stalinist-era policies to present day Russians.36 For Lieven, to view past conduct as less a product of history and more a product of culture or “national DNA” of sorts, comes perilously close to racism. There is a certain essentialism in the American discourse on Russia that equates these acts with “Russianness.” Perhaps, as Tsygankov suggests, demonizing Russia continued to help justify US strategy toward the USSR in the Cold War. For Lieven, this legitimized the military buildup, the containment, the worldview and actions that stemmed from the need to balance Soviet power.37 Yet, as Lieven importantly notes, even those who demonize Russia for its past seem to have little problem embracing Communist China,38 so perhaps it is not communism in Russia’s past the Western leaders fear, but rather something cultural, something innately “Russian.”

Lieven concurs about the self-reinforcing nature of Russophobia, noting the US’ “need for enemies”39 as an instrumental component of its own narrative of exceptionalism. Perhaps the result of viewing Russia as the enemy for so long is the reason it has become one. Russophobia has enabled the judging of Russia “by utterly different standards than those applied to other countries.”40 Tsygankov and Lieven are correct to suggest a linkage between Russophobia and America’s own mythologies about its place in the world. America’s destiny is to be a cultural hegemon atop the global hierarchy of nations. The perception of American superiority seems to require an “other” to assume a position of inferiority. Russia has long represented a new cultural frontier and a divergent history, one that was assumed to be far less “exceptional” than the American experience. Challenges to the presumption of American hegemony have often been met with not simply disagreement, but a de-legitimizing of the very existence of the ‘other.’ Russia is not immune from ideas of exceptionalism and the two nations have perpetuated a soft rivalry that possesses “nationalist phobias”41 that can be mutually reinforcing.

Gertan Dijkink acknowledges that this “gross distinction between East and West as opposite cultures” is part of the US discourse on Russia.42 For Dijkink, this does not have to be addressed directly, or be part of a public discussion, because it has become “naturalized,” or considered to be common sense. He notes that experience and discourse create an imaginative geography of the outside world, which contributes to the construction of visions of the world.”43 Dijkink notes that, after all, “American foreign policy aims to perpetuate, serve and affirm the American way of life,”44 thus helping to explain why Russia’s alternative to “the American way,” presents a challenge. Georg Lofflman confirms the impact of mythology on discourse and the influence on foreign policy outcomes.45 Myths shape identity, become themselves part of identity, and influence action. It is reasonable to suggest that American exceptionalism influences Russophobia. If the US is unique, its values superior, and therefore its preeminence in the international system assumed, and if Russia fundamentally challenges these values – America’s very identity – in some way, then fear of what Russia represents may be a consequence. Putin himself famously warned Americans in 2013 of the dangers of seeing themselves as exceptional.46

Richard Sakwa notes the difficult time US leaders have had accepting Russia as an equal.47 Russia did not see itself as a defeated power after the Cold War and conducted itself as such, a view in opposition to the prevailing Washington narrative. Sakwa notes that Russia as a democratic state was no less revisionist than Russia as a communist state and that this was threatening to the existing world order that presumed the hegemony of western liberal ideas.48 Even though Russian foreign policy was actually fairly unthreatening, and could even be characterized as collaborative for many years, it was not universally viewed this way because of the geopolitical threat it was perceived to represent.49 Sakwa also claims that some of the anti-Russianism has a strong basis in history, as Russia has never really been considered to be a part of Europe. Its very presence has motivated European integration; post WWII European identity was constructed on the basis of Russian exclusion, a reality that was confirmed by decades of the Cold War. That the fear of Russia and the exclusionary attitude toward Russia persist, driven largely by the United States and the derivative suspicion of Russia from the Cold War period, is problematic but not surprising.50

Russophobia in Western discourse has been written about, by Russians themselves - poets and writers - for nearly two centuries.51 Some have suggested that Russian fears of American Russophobia fuel a siege mentality present within Moscow since the end of the Cold War. Russophobia has had an impact; it has influenced the manner in which Russia approaches its own relations with the West. Valentina Feklyunina confirms that the assumption of American Russophobia by Russians themselves has shaped Russia’s self perception, and more importantly it has shaped Russia’s expectations for how foreign nations will engage with them.52 Russian leaders anticipate anti-Russianism in their dealings with the West, which shapes and perpetuate an “us vs. them” discourse among Russian decision makers that may be reinforcing the narrative of fear in Washington.

Russophobia ought not be confused with criticism of Russia. Heikki Luostarinen cautions that Finland, for example, no longer exhibits Russophobia, but that it remains free to offer social and political criticism.53 Russophobia is more than a disagreement or even competing values; in fact, during the Cold War, Russophobia took on what Luostarinen identifies as racist tones reflected in movies about the evils of the Soviet empire.54 The USSR was often cast not simply as the enemy, but as an evil villain, which justified its complete evisceration and for which no action taken toward this goal could be considered illegitimate. This demonization of the enemy may have parallels with the post 9/11 discourse about terrorist groups such as Al Qaeda and the Islamic State (IS). During the Cold War, hostilities with the Soviet Union gave way to “fear, moral disgust and ignorance,” which were coupled with a lack of knowledge about the Soviet Union. Luostarinen explains that this enemy imaging involves the belief, by a cultural or political group and even a nation state itself, that one’s very security and fundamental values are purposefully and meaningfully threatened by the other.55 This enemy becomes essential to identity construction and may even serve some collective psychological need to perceive a threat for which a harsh response is justified. Externalizing a common threat can be essential to legitimizing a collective identity and historical experience.56 This “us vs. them” narrative can feed a powerful nationalism, which can provide a context for behaviors that might otherwise be difficult to legitimize. This enemy construction can become ingrained as mythology among members of a society. The “enemy image may strengthen integration within a given group and moderate internal conflicts; it may help to bring the rank and file behind the group leaders; it may be used (scapegoat) to explain any injustices within the group.”57 Luostarinen is careful to note that the construction of an enemy image does not mean that the so-called enemy itself is not guilty of actions that contribute to its demonization. The construction of an enemy image of Russia stems largely from the very real fact that, for centuries, Russia has stood for much of what Western values opposed: “autocracy, national repression, and conservatism” and later “radicalism and social revolution.”58 Fear of Russian aggression has been in place since the 16th Century, blossoming alongside the growth of Russian power.59 But this fear was coupled with the racist view of Russians as an inferior, inherently violent race that could not be trusted, thereby necessitating the conclusion that peaceful coexistence could not be countenanced; mistrust of the Russian leadership transformed into a cultural loathing of Russians themselves.60 John Gleason describes as deep seated fear or dislike of Russia, which is the result of misunderstanding of Russian history and culture, rooted in “competitive imperial ambitions.”61 Gleason notes that it may be a natural inclination to fear that which we know the least,62 which could help to explain the presence of Russophobia in earlier periods when connection with cultures across the globe was a rare occurrence. It does far less to explain the persistence of Russophobia in a time in which, notwithstanding the warnings of Samuel Huntington and others for whom cultural difference is a basis for conflict,63 contemporary access to a diversity of cultures can prompt cultural awareness, acceptance, and even fusion. This does not appear to be the case with American views of Russia, which remain imbued with an air of repugnance in which even minor differences take on elevated significance.

This lingering hostility toward Russia – Russophobia - has fostered an environment in which cooperation is difficult and missed opportunities abound. As a consequence of the perpetual misinterpretation of Russia, US leaders miss key opportunities for finding compatibility with Russia, particularly in key matters of security such as fighting terrorism, dealing with weapons proliferation, illegal drugs, energy security and working together to address instability in strategic and volatile regions64 and informs the pursuit of a foreign policy agenda that needlessly antagonizes Russia in an already uncertain international system. Moreover, the expansion of NATO eastward is evidence for some that the US continues to fight the Cold War and has perpetuated in response an extant anti-Americanism in Russia that will continue to make it difficult for the US to pursue its interests.

#### Russia is status-seeking, not revisionist---containment is causes serial policy failure and war

Andrej Krickovic 18. Assistant Professor at the Higher School of Economics. “Russia’s Challenge: A Declining Power’s Quest for Status.” PONARS Eurasia. Policy Memo. 10-2018. <http://www.ponarseurasia.org/memo/russia-challenge-declining-power-quest-status>

Pursuing Status

What these dominant IR paradigms have missed is the pivotal importance of status to Russia. Status is the collective belief held by states and statesmen about a country’s ranking in the international hierarchy based on valued attributes, such as military capabilities, economic wealth, culture, and socio-political organization. Most studies of status focus on its social and psychological dimensions. States want to improve their status because of its integral importance to individuals’ and groups’ sense of identity and self-esteem. But states also pursue status because it has instrumental value. It is the “currency” of international relations; when a state has status, it does not have to use its material resources to get what it wants.

Status concerns have played a pivotal role in Russian foreign policymaking throughout the post-Soviet period. Under its first post-Communist foreign minister, Andrey Kozyrev, Russia pursued democratic and liberal reforms not only because it would improve the material wellbeing of its people, but also because its leaders believed Russia would be allowed to take its rightful place alongside the democratic and liberal powers of the West. When this strategy of status seeking through social mobility failed, Russia, under the stewardship of Yevgeny Primakov, former foreign minister and prime minister, sought to increase its status through limited geopolitical competition with the West. However, it was still too weak to counter U.S. power effectively. Its efforts to do so, such as Primakov’s attempts to form a strategic triangle with China and India to balance the United States, or the hasty decision to dispatch Russian paratroops to Kosovo to beat out the arrival of NATO peacekeepers in 1999, yielded few results, making Russia look impotent, incompetent, and out of touch with reality.

Russia abandoned these seemingly quixotic policies during Putin’ first two terms and again tried to find its place in the U.S.-led order. This time not by transforming itself into a model liberal democratic state but by establishing itself as a valuable partner for the United States in the post-9/11 “War on Terror” and by using its natural resource wealth to modernize its economy and emerge as an energy super power. Neither of these aspirations came to fruition. The United States did not accept Russia as an equal partner and it continued to pursue policies, such as NATO enlargement, that led to further status losses for Moscow. Russia’s resource-led growth model exhausted itself domestically and was undermined by larger changes to world energy markets.

As a result, Russia has again turned toward geopolitical competition with the United States. U.S. relative decline and Russia’s limited recovery from the Soviet collapse make this strategy more effective this time around. Moscow can leverage its still formidable military, diplomatic, and espionage capabilities to act as global spoiler to Washington. Russia’s goal is not to knock the United States off the top spot in the global status hierarchy and assume this position for itself. Instead, Russia is trying to force the United States to recognize Russia’s continued relevance and get it to acquiesce to a “grand bargain” on the international order that is more favorable to Russia’s status aspirations.

What IR liberals missed is that Russia could not join the liberal international order on the terms that were acceptable to its leaders and public. Russia would not only have to accept a subordinate role to the more powerful United States, it would also have to accept a lower status to Germany, Japan, and Great Britain, which are more advanced in other attributes that are valued inside the liberal order such as democracy, human rights, and economic liberalism. For their part, IR realists failed to recognize the importance of status and how it could push a declining power such as Russia to pursue policies that are not commensurate with its capabilities. Russia opposes NATO enlargement and ABM not because they are a threat to its security but because they undermine its status as regional hegemon in the post-Soviet space and nuclear equal of the United States.

Status concerns are particularly important to declining great powers, such as Russia today or Austria-Hungary in 1914. These powers face the predicament of decline: they have inherited a large patrimony of interests from the times when they were great and powerful, yet they have a declining material capability to defend this patrimony. They must rely on status to defend their interests and thus fiercely resist its decline.

Russia is not the typical challenger envisioned by PT theories. It is not trying to completely overturn the order and replace it with governance structures of its own design. It is more accurate to characterize Russia as a “reactionary challenger,” using the term “reactionary” strictly in its definitional rather than pejorative sense, as referring to a person or entity’s preference for a return to the status quo ante. In place of U.S. unipolar dominance, Russia would like to see the return of multipolarity enshrined in a Great Power Concert where the United States would have to share power with other great powers. A Great Power Concert serves Moscow’s status aspirations in that it firmly entrenches Russia’s position as one of the leading states in the international system—even as its relative power continues to decline.

Policies and Conclusions

How should the United States and its Western allies deal with a declining challenger such as Russia? One seemingly rational policy might be to ignore Russia for the time being and to postpone the day of reckoning to the future, when Russia will be weaker. This was the approach largely followed by the Obama administration. However, it provokes Russia into engaging in even more reckless and destabilizing behavior in order for it to have its voice heard—as Obama soon found out in Ukraine and Syria. Containment, the policy now favored by many Russia hawks in Washington, risks dangerous confrontation with a country that, despite its weaknesses, is still a nuclear superpower with a formidable military. What’s more, containment is unnecessary. Russia’s leaders are well aware of the limits of their country’s power and are not looking to overtake the United States as the global hegemon or to take over management of the international system. Accommodating Russia’s status aspirations will not embolden it to pursue more radical revisionism.

Instead of ignoring or containing Russia, Western leaders must try to find ways to channel its status-seeking behavior in constructive ways that contribute to global peace, stability, and development. Russia’s efforts toward economic reintegration of the post-Soviet space may have been such an opportunity. From the very start, Russian leaders made it clear that these efforts were not aimed at creating a closed neo-Soviet trade block, but were designed to strengthen Russia’s position in the larger process of pan-European integration with the EU. Eurasian economic integration could have contributed to the economic development and stability of a problematic and dangerous region while also allowing Russia to improve its international status through peaceful and constructive means. Instead of engaging with Russia’s regional integration efforts, the United States and the EU pushed back against them, threatening Moscow with further status losses and provoking (what should have been) a predictable backlash.

Other opportunities to engage Russia’s status seeking in a constructive way will present themselves in Syria, Ukraine, and in the geopolitical realignments that China’s rise will generate. They will confront Western policy makers with difficult choices that will force them to find a balance between their beliefs and values and the harsh realities of power politics. In making these choices, they must understand just how important status concerns are for Russia and realize that the bigger dangers come not from empowering a declining Russia through accommodation, but from ignoring its status aspirations or seeking to constrain them.

1. Tsing, Anna, *The Mushroom at the End of the World*, Professor of anthropology at the University of Santa Cruz and recipient of the Huxley Memorial Medal of the Royal Anthropological Institute, Princeton University Press, 2015 [↑](#footnote-ref-1)
2. Tsing, Anna, *The Mushroom at the End of the World*, Professor of anthropology at the University of Santa Cruz and recipient of the Huxley Memorial Medal of the Royal Anthropological Institute, Princeton University Press, 2015 [↑](#footnote-ref-2)
3. Roland Bleiker, Senior Lecturer and Coordinator of the Peace and Conflict Studies Program at the University of Queensland, “Popular Dissent, Human Agency and Global Politics,” 2000, Cambridge Studies in International Relations [↑](#footnote-ref-3)